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Empathy is a central concern in the counselling process. Though much researched, and 
broadly commented upon, empathy is still largely understood through the words within 
a client-counsellor interaction. This semantic focus continues despite converging lines 
of evidence that suggest other elements of an interaction – for example body language 
– may be involved in the communication of empathy. In this thesis, the foundations of 
empathy are examined, focusing on empathy’s professional instantiation. These 
foundations are then related to the idea that the face, and its ability to express 
emotion, are an important part of the empathic process. What follows is an experiment 
testing 60 participants. This was a between groups design, with participants assigned 
to two even groups; one group receiving training in how emotion appears on the face: 
using the training program eMETT; the other reading a passage on empathy. Following 
the intervention, hypothesised group differences were assessed using the following 
analyses. Firstly, an Independent sample T-test, compared group means on the Ickes 
Empathic Accuracy paradigm, the measure of empathy used. Secondly, a further 
Independent sample T-test assessed the effect of eMETT training. Thirdly, an ANCOVA, 
evaluated whether the obtained results may have been confounded by age difference 
between the experimental groups. Finally a correlational analyse tested for any 
relationship between baseline and outcome measures. The hypothesis tested stated: 
training in facial expressions of emotion will enhance counsellors’ empathic accuracy; a 
hypothesis for which positive evidence was shown. The implications of this evidence 
suggest efficacy of the eMETT training to enhance empathic accuracy, though this is 
qualified through critical examination of the experimental method. Suggestions for 
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What motivated this research? 
I remember the first thing I ever read about psychology. It was a book that in 
academic circles might be considered a little lightweight, but to my 15-year-old mind it 
was something of a revelation. The book "Body language: How to read others thoughts 
by their gestures "(Pease, 1981) certainly has a title that now seems if not spurious, 
then certainly questionable. If psychological science has "proved" anything over the 
last 150 years, it is that the content of others’ minds is on many levels, unknowable. 
Nonetheless, Alan Pease’s book (1981) started both my interest in non-verbal 
communication, and psychology. Skip forward 20 years, and when asked by our 
supervisors to begin thinking about our research direction, I already knew that I 
wanted to study expressive behaviour.  
There was however, another pull in the direction of non-verbal communication. 
As part of my interest in non-verbal behaviour I had bought myself an online training 
package: Paul Ekman’s Micro Expression Training Tool1 (eMETT); a training I was doing 
about once a month in the first year of the PsychD. During the summer of my first 
academic year (2012/3) I had a client called Nancy2 who I was working with in a charity 
in southwest London. I distinctly remember an early assessment session in which 
Nancy and I discussed her family relationships. As part of this discussion I asked her: 
“And what about your dad, what do you think about him?” At the mention of her 
                                                          




father, a distinct look of disgust crossed Nancy’s face, her words though did not match 
this look; she replied simply: “He’s alright”.  
Navarro and Karlins (2008) argue non-verbal communication should be 
interpreted in clusters and in context, not simply as single expressions or gesture. 
Therefore, whilst a single flash of disgust is far from conclusive, further flashes of 
disgust at the mention of Nancy’s father became something of an empathic tell for me: 
it seemed probable that Nancy thought more about her father than “He’s alright”. It is 
practically axiomatic that when a client is vague about a topic there is almost certainly 
more to it, but a flash of disgust pointed that the “more to it”, was perhaps quite 
extreme, and might influence the direction of our work. Nancy’s revelation some 
sessions later that her father had been violent to her and her mother – presaged as it 
was by her brief expression – was less shocking and more easily contained than it 
might otherwise have been. Equally, I knew from the outset of my work with Nancy – 
by noticing this non-verbal cue – that our work might get into some traumatic 
territory, giving me time before her revelation to ground myself and discuss options in 
supervision. 
The portent of Nancy’s expression was the beginning of my noticing similar 
experiences where facial expression either enhanced, or nuanced, my understanding 
of clients. I came to question how facial communication was helping me understand 
clients, and decided that I would like to research specifically: how had eMETT 
enhanced – or given a fillip to – my understanding of clients. It was this question that 
motivated my research.  
9 
 
Why do I believe this topic is important? 
The first year of the PsychD had been dominated by Person Centred practice 
and study; the second was to be focused on the psychodynamic theory. The practice – 
or practical texts – I had read on the Person Centred school, and the books I was then 
reading on the psychodynamic approach, had made various references to “body 
language” (Cooper, O'Hara, Schmid, & Wyatt, 2007) ; “non-verbal behaviour” (Howe, 
Brandon, Hinings, & Schofield, 1999); and “non-verbal communication” (Lemma, 
2003). Each of these texts saw such behavioural expression of emotion as an important 
part of the therapeutic process; indeed, The Trainee Handbook (Bor & Watts, 2011) is 
quite clear that observations of such are relevant to the writing of process reports. 
Bearing in mind then, that expressive behaviour is an important part of the therapy 
process, how much instruction were we as trainees given in it? None. This was the case 
across PsychD courses in the UK3. 
Clearly it is not just non-verbal communication that is important to this study, 
empathy is central too. Empathy is important to me personally, because I draw much 
of my model of practice from the Person Centred School and Self psychology; both 
approaches that see empathy as critical to the psychotherapy process. But empathy is 
of professional importance not just for solipsistic reasons, as pointed out by the 
findings in “Psychotherapy Relationships that Work” (Norcross & Lambert, 2009). This 
edited book compiled the findings of “the best available research and clinical practices 
on numerous elements of the therapy relationship” (Norcross, 2009). This review 
recommends “the creation and cultivation of a therapy relationship characterised by 
                                                          
3 Web search of all PsychD course sites and modules listed carried out May 2014. 
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the elements found to be demonstrably… effective, a primary aim in the treatment of 
patients.” (Norcross & Wampold, 2009). Within the category “Demonstrably” effective, 
is empathy, one of only four demonstrably effective elements of psychotherapy 
relationships (Norcross & Wampold, 2009). 
The effectiveness of empathy within psychotherapy relationships is perhaps 
why there is plenty of relational theory stressing the importance of the felt sense of 
the relationship (Cooper, O'Hara, Schmid, & Wyatt, 2007). “What” this sense is, has 
been described as empathy (Rogers, 1956), vicarious introspection (Goldberg, 2011), 
or countertransference (Steiner, 1994): all processes requiring some window into the 
other. However, counselling psychology has tended to favour the “what?” question, 
whilst eschewing the “How?” question. There is therefore little indication of exactly 
how the window into the other worked. Indeed, with empathy – and other 
interpersonal processes – authors often seem to account for the phenomenon with 
“almost magical or telepathic processes between patient and analyst” (Gallese, Eagle, 
& Migone, 2007, p. 150). When reading of empathy and interpersonal processes, one 
could easily develop the impression that analysts possessed “extrasensory perception” 
(Buie, 1981, p. 283). Personally, I felt somewhat lost in an ethereal process, 
surrounded by nebulous language.  
Having done my undergraduate dissertation on empathy for pain, I had studied 
a more realist and quantitative – mainly neuroscientific – view of empathy. In this 
literature there was a theoretical framework for understanding how empathy arose, 
and more interestingly for someone with my motivation, a putative link between 
empathy and non-verbal communication. Thus literature that perhaps traditionally sat 
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outside the purview of counselling, was offering a potential understanding of “how” 
empathy worked. This understanding both matched my motivation, and offered an 
opportunity to clarify a process so central to counselling. 
My research then is important to the field for two reasons. Firstly it may shed 
some light on how empathy is generated, making empathy less “magical” (Gallesse et 
al., 2007) and less amorphous. Moreover, far from being a reductive or mechanistic 
endeavour, by integrating into the field a set of literature that has hitherto remained 
somewhat ignored, I hope to show that empathy may be subject to enhancement 
through training; allowing counsellors a route to better client care and stronger client 
relationships.  
Why an experiment? 
Through my experience with Nancy – and others –I came to understand that I 
“tuned” my empathy using a blend of prosody, facial expression, and speech content 
(see Regenbogen, et al., 2012 for discusion of this). The doctorate I was doing seemed 
only to focus – explicitly anyway – on prosody and speech content. I had, I felt, found a 
gap in both course content and literature that I might begin to explore. Riess et al. 
(2012) had used some facial expressions to train doctors and other medical staff to 
enhance empathy, a practical application of the third – facial – channel.  However, the 
population studied in Riess et al. (2012) has also been suggested to have lowered 
empathic ability (Hojat et al., 2009; Newton et al., 2008). Would similar training be as 
effective in counsellors, a more empathically able group (Hassenstab, Dziobek, Rogers, 
Wolf, & Convit, 2007)? My study would look at whether such training can enhance 
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empathy in psychotherapy professionals and trainees, but I wanted to do this in a 
controlled and replicable way.  
Bearing in mind the more phenomenological aspect of the doctorate, and 
indeed my will to embrace a more relational stance to subjectivity, it is clearly 
important to question my methodology. An experiment is the apotheosis of the 
quantitative tradition, and in many ways anathema to those interested in qualia. 
However, an experiment was also the best way to match my motivation with the more 
quantitative literature; and were this experiment able to test subjective experience 
against objective knowledge, it can be seen as phenomenologically sound. This is what 














In tracing the history of empathy, I began with literature from both the person 
centred school – for example Rogers (1975) – and literature from the neuroscientific 
tradition examining empathy for pain; for example Master et al. (2009). Tracing 
references from these sources and deepening my understanding of empathy, I also 
broadened it through searches of the Web of Science, Scopus, and Pubmed. I searched 
for the key words “empathy”; “empathy facial expressions”; “empathy training”; 
“teaching empathy” and “empathic accuracy”. These searches revealed a vast 
literature, but in reality much of this literature was irrelevant, at least in part because 
the empathy literature is both varied and multifaceted.  
Serendipitously, a review of how facial expressions were being used in empathy 
research was published early in 2015 (Regenbogen & Habel, 2015), this confirmed 
what my literature search had suggested: that whilst growing in size, the literature on 
empathy and facial expressions was still limited. More pertinently, there were no 
previously recorded instances of the use of facial expression training to enhance 
empathy anywhere in the psychological literature (Regenbogen & Habel, 2015).  
Much modern writing about empathy – especially the more realist postivistic 
literature – is concerned with what might be called innate human empathy (e.g. Blair, 
2005; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). 
This is the near universal human capacity to infer the emotions of others; empathy is 
commonplace, quotidien, and basic; a capacity that only some humans may lack 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). This innate capacity to empathise has been 
“professionalised”, at least by the therapeutic arm of the psychological community, 
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and there are a number of theories on the professional use of empathy. However, 
these theories are almost entirely separate fields of theoretical knowledge and 
application. These knowledge territories are based on quite disparate definitions of 
empathy, somewhat divorced from the ordinary human capacity to empathise.  
Empathy can therefore be seen as split in two, becoming empathy in a 
professional context, and empathy in the wider human context. Whilst ostensibly 
these “empathys” are exactly the same thing, professional empathy uses the innate 
human empathic tendency in a different manner. As an aspiring member of the 
therapeutic community – a counselling psychologist in training – it is pertinent perhaps 
to ask: a) what is empathy? and b) how can one understand, definitionally underpin, 
and disentangle, professional and innate empathy? It is worth noting at this point that 
the only major point of agreement in the empathy literature I reviewed, was that there 
is no agreed definition of empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2006; Duan & Hill, 1996; Elliott, 
Bohart, Watson, & Greenberg, 2011; Levenson & Ruef, 1992; Preston & De Waal, 
2002).  
Below, the literature on innate – hereafter personal – empathy, will be 
reviewed. This review will synthesise, and extract commonalities in, empathy 
definitions; it will then use this definitional coalescence as a foundation for clarifying 
what is distinct in the professional use of empathy. This clarity will also bring an 
integration and thereby, I hope, create something of a rapproachment between both 
levels of explanation and realms of research. Once the review of empathy and its 
professional application is complete, this will be related to the relevant literature on 
facial expressions of emotion, which is the second research focus of this thesis. These 
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two foci provide a rationale for how eMETT might help counselling professionals in 
their empathic endeavours, creating a training hypothesis: the empathy fillip.   
Historical Semantics 
Etymologically speaking, empathy is a relative newcomer to the English 
language, having only been introduced to English as a translation from the German 
word – Einfühlung – by Titchener in 1909 (Preston & De Waal, 2002). Empathy was 
originally a term used in aesthetics, describing the idea that aesthetic works might 
demonstrate an “inner mental or spiritual reality” (Stuber, 2006, p. 6). Moreover, 
empathy expressed the idea that one might appraise a given object by projection of 
the bodily self into the thing being appraised (Jahoda, 2005). In this early use of the 
word, there is nascent an idea that empathy is a capacity to feel something through 
projection of self; the modern conception of empathy then limits this projection to 
working of the minds of others (De Waal, 2008).  
Much of what one might define as empathy today, was formerly subsumed 
under the term “sympathy” (Jahoda, 2005). Sympathy was a wider term, which, whilst 
it carried the idea of affective sharing between people, was also used to designate 
affiliation between entities. In terms of entities, sympathy denoted – amongst other 
things – what drug to use to combat what ailment, and the spreading of disease. There 
were others who used the term empathy in a more psychological sense, beginning to 
bifurcate the meanings of sympathy and empathy (Stuber, 2006); however, it was 
Theodor Lipps who did most to carve out the semantic territory of empathy (Jahoda, 
2005). Lipps saw empathy as the decisive element in how humans “come to know 
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other people’s minds” (Jahoda, 2005, p. 155), and was first to associate this with “inner 
imitation” (Stuber, 2006, p. 8)   
Whilst inner imitation is a piece of terminology that is recognisable as a 
precursor to the modern conception of empathy, Lipps would also often use the terms 
empathy, and sympathy, without making a clear distinction in their meaning. Indeed, 
far from differentiation, “sympathetic empathy” (Jahoda, 2005) was part of Lipps’ 
lexicon when referring to this concept. It was Edith Stein’s “On the Problem of 
Empathy” (1917/1986) that developed the concept of empathy more fully in its own 
right (Stuber, 2006). Stein (1917/1986) – whilst acknowledging some similarity of 
definition with Lipps – makes it clear that her definition is distinct from that of Lipps, 
and does not associate empathy with sympathy. So whilst Lipps was perhaps the father 
of empathy, Stein nurtured the concept, allowing it to semantically stand alone. 
Developing Definition 
Much of psychotherapy that came before Carl Rogers either ignored empathy, 
or sought to expunge it in some way from the professional setting. By contrast, Rogers 
saw empathy as a necessary and sufficient condition for therapeutic change (Rogers, 
1956). Rogers conceived of empathy as entering “fully into the world of his [the 
client’s] feelings and personal meanings and see these as he does” (Rogers, 1961, p. 
53); doing this “as if it were your own, but without ever losing the ‘as if’ quality” 
(Rogers, 1956, p. 4). In later work Rogers was keen to point out that empathy is a 
“process, rather than a state” (1975, p. 2); he makes the point empathy is a “complex 
demanding… way of being” (1975, p. 3). A further division Rogers makes here is that of 
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“feelings” and “personal meanings”, one which developing conceptions of empathy 
have made much of. This division is a precursor to the dichotomy between cognitive 
and affective empathy, a feature of modern conceptions of empathy (Batson, 2009; 
Blair, 2005; Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Vollm, 2011).  
The work of Heinz Kohut, as both a pioneer in the psychodynamic 
understanding of empathy, and a practitioner who put empathy central in his work, 
also bears review. Unlike Rogers, Kohut did not see empathy as a sufficient condition 
in therapy, but did see it as a necessary one (Kohut, 1959). Kohut construed empathy 
as “vicarious introspection” (Kohut, 1984), and like Rogers saw it as an individual’s 
coming to “experience the inner life of another whilst simultaneously retaining the 
stance of an objective observer” (Kohut, 1984, p. 175). Kohut splits empathy into two 
“levels”, with the second level having two speeds. Empathy is therefore either a 
“powerful emotional bond” or an “information gathering activity”, the latter being 
either the fast “intuitive” empathy, or the more slow — “and ploddingly” — pursued 
empathy (Kohut, 1982, p. 396). Here again, we see forerunners for the ideas of 
cognitive and affective empathy in fast and slow empathic processes. Similar to 
Rogers’ (1975) idea of complex empathy, we see a notion that empathy is both a 
natural bond, and something used therapeutically. This distinction – between 
professional, information gathering empathy, and more personal, or layman emotional 




Although the definitions offered by Kohut (1959) and Rogers (1956) are on 
some level straightforward, they are certainly open to the criticism that they are 
oversimplified, and insufficiently incisive. Whilst this leaves both the professional and 
the scholar plenty of room for interpretation, it can also leave one feeling a little lost. 
These definitions give us little clue as to how empathy works, something that is vital 
for those trying to enhance their empathic skills, and important for those seeking a 
slightly deeper understanding of empathy. At the other end of the spectrum Batson 
(2009), identifies eight different “things” (Batson D. , 2009, p. 3) he calls empathy. He 
also makes the point that empathy has been used to try to account for two different 
phenomena. The first is how can humans know what others are thinking and feeling. 
The second is what leads humans to respond to the suffering of others.  
Batson (2009) not only separates empathy’s emotional bonding capacity – like 
Kohut (1982) – he also alludes to his long running intellectual skirmish over whether 
empathy is a pro-social drive (Batson, et al., 1991) or a more selfishly motivated driver 
(Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989). Putting such evolutionary considerations aside for a 
moment, consideration of Batson’s (2009) eight things is a good starting point from 
which to narrow down the definition of empathy; they are as follows: 
1. Recognising the emotions and cognitions of the other. 
2. Assuming the pose or matching the neural responses of another.  
3. Feeling the same way as another. 




5. Imagining the thoughts and emotions of the other.  
6. Imagining yourself in the situation of the other, and the resultant thoughts and 
feelings elicited. 
7. Personal distress felt when witnessing another’s suffering.  
8. Feeling for another person who is suffering – sympathy. 
 The above points are certainly a comprehensive list, which, whilst conflating a 
number of concepts, makes the point that empathy scholars are “a cantankerous lot” 
(Batson D. , 2009, p. 3).  
To begin to narrow the focus, the argument can be made that Point 1, whilst a 
necessary developmental precursor to empathy (Hoffman, 1975), can be removed 
from the list: recognition without any involvement doesn’t seem to qualify as 
empathy, but is rather emotional perception. Similarly, Point 6 seems to describe 
perspective taking, but as De Waal points out, perspective taking “by itself is, of 
course, hardly empathy” it can only be empathy “in combination with emotional 
engagement” (De Waal, 2008, p. 285). Points 7 and 8 are arguably the same thing, and 
here Batson (2009) seems almost to be making the same definitional conflation that 
Lipps made 100 years earlier (Jahoda, 2005). Point 4 looks back to empathy’s nascent 
semantics, and is more of an ontogenic by-product, than a central component of 
empathy. Batson’s (2009) eight things do clarify one thing: it is important to delimit 
this term. This review will do so by focusing on a definition of empathy that clarifies 




In narrowing down the term empathy, it will be useful to start with a 
framework within which our definition can reside. One such framework is the 
Perception-Action Model of empathy (PAM) (Preston & De Waal, 2002); of particular 
relevance here because of its ability to unite the levels of explanation, from proximate 
to ultimate, or to use the terminology from the Introduction: from “how” to “what”. 
The PAM is also sufficiently broad to allow any number of definitions of empathy to be 
structured, whilst also specifying the necessary and sufficient parts of a definition of 
empathy. It is because of the PAM’s generalist capacity, combined with sufficient 
specificity, that it will be used as the framework for the following discussion.  
Preston and De Waal (2002) make an evolutionary argument that empathy 
evolved out of the human neural system’s organisation. From a natural selection 
perspective, an organism’s nervous system must react to the environment in ways that 
generate adaptive responses to survive. If such a system arises, these adaptive 
responses will reduce the likelihood that the organism will be consigned to the fossil 
record. Preston and De Waal (2002) suggest the perception-action coupling is a model 
that can account for much of what in humans is called altruistic behaviour, describing a 
set of adaptive responses that has enabled man to survive and thrive as a species 
(Batson, et al., 1991; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; De Waal, 2008; 
Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989). For this behaviour to have arisen, a proximate cause 
is required for the ultimately adaptive responses. Preston and De Wall hypothesise 




In order for altruistic acts to be elicited, the subject must feel connected to the 
object, sensing that in some way “they are like me, and I feel their pain”. This requires 
emotional contagion, the phylogenetically basic mechanism by which species members 
can become connected to other members. Emotional contagion manifests itself 
through the subjects’ feelings of alarm, fear, or pain, elicited by the alarm, fear, or 
pain, of another. This capacity connects species members into groups capable of 
feeling as another member feels (Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). At the neural level, 
such a connection relies on perception and action being coded in the brain using a 
single “representation”. This means perceiving the actions of another generates a 
representation at the perceptual level, and automatically generates a motor 
representation of this action (Preston & De Waal, 2002). This motor representation not 
only primes and controls behaviour, but elicits in the brain both cognitive and 
emotional responses.  
Through perception-action coupling, conspecifics can be alerted to potential 
hazards to their offspring, and themselves. This generates adaptive behaviour: parents 
are affected by the plight of their children through representation linkage, and will 
therefore tend to better ensure their survival. In the wider group context, emotional 
contagion may lead – as in humans – to the emergence of sympathetic concern. This is 
phylogenetically more advanced and enabled an adaptive advantage to the species. 
Sympathetic concern gave rise to group bonding, manifested at a neural level as group 
members’ mutual shared representations of certain perceptual cues. Group 
representations allowed the rapid transmission of emotional information (Eisenberger, 
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), an example might be the shared representation of pain. 
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Group members are affected by the pain – both social and physical – of other 
members (Master, et al., 2009; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009), they share a 
representation of pain. By seeking to alleviate shared pain, group members come to 
each other’s aid; enhancing the advantages of being in a group through reciprocal 
altruistic acts, a factor that would enhance inclusive fitness.  
The final level of PAM is that of perspective taking, that facet of empathy which 
connects it to higher cognitive function through the individuals’ capacity to hold 
shared representations in mind, thereby experiencing the world from the perspective 
of the other. This ability requires a strong sense of identity so that the subject can 
maintain the self-other distinction whilst considering the other (Preston & De Waal, 
2002). Such a distinction is again phylogenetically and developmentally (Harris & 
Butterworth, 2002) advanced, and confers the advantage of greater social regulation 
and group cohesion, both likely to enhance survival through the ensuing cooperation 
and collective effort (Decety & Jackson, 2003).  
From the above we can see that PAM not only situates definitional divisions in 
the wider epistemological context, it provides shape for any model of empathy. PAM 
stipulates that emotional contagion underlies any empathic ability, thus any definition 
of empathy should contain emotional contagion, or an analogous system. Any 
definition of empathy should also contain sympathetic concern, or an idea that 
empathy involves shared meaning, or will be effected by such meaning. Finally, PAM 




Applying PAM we can use the hierarchy it sets out to help shape our 
understanding of any model of empathy. Blair (2005) – on the basis of the study of 
“psychiatric populations” – outlines a triumvirate of empathic elements. Blair’s three 
empathic elements are: cognitive empathy; motor empathy, similar to Batson’s (2009) 
point 2 and almost identical to emotional contagion; and emotional empathy. 
Cognitive empathy consists of understanding the feelings of others through the 
“setting aside one’s current perspective, attributing a mental state (or “attitude”) to 
the other person” (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004, p. 164). Blair equates cognitive 
empathy with theory of mind (TOM), a conceptual overlap that is not unique to Blair 
(2009): Gonzalez-Liecras, Shamay-Tsoory, and Brun (2013) make the same conflation. 
TOM, mentalising, or mind reading, are the names given to the set of abilities which 
allow humans to “naturally explain people’s behaviour on the basis of their minds: 
their knowledge, their beliefs and their desires” (Frith & Frith; 2005, p. 644).These 
definitions are extremely close and we can perhaps see why Blair (2009) conflates the 
two; however, TOM seems to be a more encompassing concept than cognitive 
empathy. Taking the perspective of another, which may have also been termed “self-
projection” (Waytz & Mitchell, 2011), is a somewhat narrower, and more immediate 
mental action than explaining the behaviour of others as minded individuals. This 
latter idea seems to be more akin, or at least to draw more heavily upon, folk 
psychology. Folk psychology is the combined knowledge of humans and society that 
allows the layman to understand others (Stuber, 2006) – synonymous with the shared 
representations of PAM. This review will use the idea of cognitive empathy as a self-
projection or perspective taking process, rather than a more global TOM process.  
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Emotional empathy (Blair, 2005), or affective empathy (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004), are based on the idea that there is some level of emotion state-
matching; sympathetic concern.  Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) delimit four 
possibilities here: 
1. The feeling in empathiser needs to match that of the object; i.e. sad object 
feeling sadness = sad empathizer. 
2. Feeling in the empathiser is merely “appropriate” (p. 164) to the objects 
emotion. E.g. object feeling fear = empathizer feels concern.  
3. Empathisers feeling can be any feeling elicited, for example amusement at 
another’s pain.  
4. Concern for the negative feelings of another.  
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) make the point that “appropriate” is a 
difficult part of any definition as it is hard to know exactly what it implies. They use the 
example of hearing about the death of a friend. This may make you feel both happy 
that their suffering is over and sad about their death. Which is appropriate? Going 
further, they point out that the sadness of the individual may be an egocentric feeling, 
rather than empathy: their sadness maybe about personal loss, rather than the death 
of the friend per se. Adding to their example, it would seem that if someone else is 
conveying news of the friend’s death, and the empathiser’s state matches the 
messenger’s, this is emotional empathy, but not for the loss of the friend. Whereas 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) argue that from their list points 1, 2, and 4 are 
relevant to emotional empathy, point 2 seems to define sympathy, as is the case for 
25 
 
point 4 (this latter noted by Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004); and point 3 defines 
schadenfreude (Porter, Bhanwer, Woodworth, & Black, 2013).  
This review will then narrow its definition of emotional empathy to point 1: the 
feeling the empathiser needs to match that of the object, i.e. sad object will elicit 
feelings of sadness in the subject.  
Moving on to motor empathy Blair (2005), bases his model in the PAM, working 
from the same basic premise that perception and action are coded in a single 
representation. Further consideration of this is made below, but motor emapthy is 
another important part of the present defintion of empathy. It is important to note at 
this point – as Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) do – that cognitive and affective 
empathy are linked, the unique property of cognitive empathy is that it requires the 
cognitive act of putting oneself to one side and taking another’s perspective. However, 
how they are linked is not something that is discussed by Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright (2004), and again, will be looked at later. 
Thus far the definition of empathy consists of a perspective-taking capacity 
(cognitive empathy), an emotion-matching capacity (emotional empathy), and motor 
elements; though this latter, it will be argued later, is subsumed by the empathy 
element: resonation. Nonetheless, if we apply PAM to these three elements, it allows 
us to hierarchically organise them. Starting at the bottom of the hierarchy, we place 
motor empathy – synonymous with emotional contagion in the PAM – underlying the 
other empathic abilities. Above this, will be emotional empathy, the part of empathy 
that sympathetic concern will begin to generate, and finally cognitive empathy at the 
top as it aligns with perspective taking within the PAM.  
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However, PAM also shows up that Blair’s (2009) model lacks an idea that self-
identity is important if one is not to get lost in the other; we must therefore look 
further afield to add this element. For this we turn to another empathy trio, that of 
emotional simulation, perspective-taking and emotion regulation, suggested by Elliott, 
Bohart, Watson and Greenberg (2011) (but see also Decety & Jackson, 2006). Elliot et 
al’s ideas (2011) look at empathy from the professional point of view. Although 
emotion simulation and perspective taking have clear affinity to emotional and 
cognitive empathy respectively, emotion regulation shifts the definitional frame. 
Emotion regulation is the ability to regulate personal discomfort or suffering generated 
by the other—in the jargon of PAM, this would be a strong sense of identity. This 
regulatory capacity allows the subject to maintain the self-other distinction whilst 
considering the object, ensuring that the object’s pain, fear or otherwise is attributed 
to them, rather than being misattributed to the self. Elliots’ model reiterates the 
importance of emotion regulation in the empathic process, a distinction made in PAM, 
and also by other authors such as Gonzalez-Liecras et al, (2013) and Gallese (2003).  
Where this ability to make the self-other distinction is compromised, the results 
may be quite unpleasant; such is the case in Alexithymia. Alexithymia is a cluster of 
traits – or a syndrome – indicative of the fact that the individual has little in the way of 
self-concept (Nemiah, 1996). The alexithymic then has an inability to discern discrete 
feelings, a lack of fantasy or an internal world and tends to be – perhaps in 
consequence of the former criteria – somewhat engrossed in the facets of the 
surrounding environment (Nemiah, 1996). Guttman and Laporte (2002) studied 
familial alexithymia using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), which measures 
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empathic response. The IRI indicators of interest are those related to perspective 
taking, empathic concern, and personal distress; the former two measures showing 
lower scores in alexithymics verses controls, but the latter score was higher for 
alexithymics. This pattern of results has also been seen in a study of alexithymia and 
empathy for pain. Moriguchi et al (2007) showed alexithymics varying body parts in 
painful situations – for example a finger being accidentally sliced with a knife, or a door 
running over a foot. IRI results for alexithymics again showed lower ability to take 
another person’s perspective, lower empathic concern, and yet greater personal 
distress at the pain of another than cognitively normal controls (Moriguchi et al., 
2007). The pattern of results in both Guttman and Laporte (2002) and more pertinently 
Moriguchi et al (2007) are suggestive of an inability to fully dissociate oneself from 
another; even though empathic and perspective taking abilities are underdeveloped, 
personal distress at the plight of another is enhanced. Thus, the self-other distinction is 
critical to the empathic process, and we are therefore dealing with an empathy 
quartet, rather than an empathy trio. 
The Empathy Quartet 
Thus far we define empathy as having cognitive and emotional elements, with a 
need for a self-regulatory process, and motor elements. The motor element will be 
examined further below, as it is critical to the current argument. The initial trio of 
empathy elements discussed above – cognitive, emotional, self-regulatory process – 
can not only be integrated by PAM, but also align closely to those given greatest 
definitional endorsement in a survey of counsellors, counselling psychologists and 
clinical psychologists (Carlozzi, Bull, Stein, Ray, & Barnes, 2002). This survey revealed 
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that the three definitional elements of empathy given highest endorsement by this 
group of professionals were “vicarious experiencing”, “experiencing the inner life of 
others whilst retaining objectivity” and “resonating with feelings expressed by others” 
(Carlozzi et al., 2002, p. 164). In the first two of these elements we can see the three 
parts of empathy we have focused on above; it is to “resonating with feelings 
expressed by others” that we now turn. 
Resonating is a somewhat indistinct term, both in terms of its morphology and 
its modus operandi. To clarify this, Clark’s (2010) model of empathy is useful. Clark 
(2010) builds upon the Rogerian model of empathy; where Rogers (1964) described 
tripartite ways of knowing, Clark’s model proposes three distinct “knowledge 
channels”. The first is the subjective empathic channel, the moment-to-moment 
experience of the other; it is the counsellor’s internal frame of reference and the 
reactions within this toward the client during dialogue. Part of this process is gaining 
empathic understanding through short periods of identification, imagination, intuition, 
and felt-level experiencing. Identification is “kinship (through) a perceived similarity of 
experiences” (Clark, 2010, p. 349). Intuition for Clark, is use of gut feeling, “a sense” or 
“felt-level experience”; or more viscerally “bodily felt resonation” (2010, p. 350). 
Objective empathy is Clark’s (2010) second knowledge channel; understanding of a 
client is achieved by bringing to bear theoretically based knowledge from sources that 
must be “reputable reference groups external to a client’s frame of reference” (Clark, 
2010, p. 351).  
Interpersonal empathy – the last of Clark’s knowledge channels – is the 
empathic process over time, allowing the accretion of knowledge of the other and the 
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capacity to recognize “a client’s internal frame of reference and conveying a sense of 
the private meanings to the person” (2010, p. 350). If we look at these knowledge 
channels, we can begin to see certain similarities with the model laid out so far. 
Objective empathy is synonymous in many ways with cognitive empathy; theory is 
both cognitive in nature, and requires cognizing in its application. Interpersonal 
empathy is clearly founded in emotional empathy, as time goes by the relationship 
contains more shared representations: the other becomes more familiar, more 
understandable, and more easily related to. The subjective channel is again similar to 
emotional empathy, but it is more than this. Notions of a cognition or a thought are 
accessible; we can relate to the idea of an emotion; perhaps the idea of emotion 
regulation is a little less distinct, but a vernacular synonym might be “self-control”.  
Resonance, though, is a word that could be considered a little “magical”, and this is 
perhaps where reductionism might help illuminate the matter. This is more than a 
simply linguistic nicety: more readily understood empathic elements also are easier to 
experience and prepare for. To understand resonating, the cognitive science and 
neurosciences’ equivalent of “resonating” – motor empathy – should be examined. 
Resonation 
Resonation is similar to Barrett-Lennard’s (1993) “Phase 1” (p. 5) of his model 
of empathy. In this initial phase of empathy the empathizer “resonates experientially” 
to the object in “an immediacy of recognition of the other’s felt experiencing and 
meaning” (Barrett-Lennard, 1993, p. 6). From the psychodynamic perspective, when 
explaining transference and counter transference in the counselling relationship, 
Krause and Merten (1999) talk of emotion as “the predominant exchange currency of 
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interaction” (1999, p. 111). This “currency” through which relationships are transacted 
and understood is essentially the same empathic resonating that Rogers (1964), 
Barrett-Lennard’s (1993) and Clark (2010) rely on in their models.  
Resonation can be elucidated by returning briefly to the PAM. This model 
states that when the subject perceives the object’s emotional state, the subject’s 
neural representations of comparable states are activated – “automatically… unless 
inhibited” (Preston & De Waal, 2002, p. 4). This word – “automatically” — is one 
around which there is a great deal of confusion (Corradini & Antonetti, 2013). As 
Corradini and Antonetti (2013) point out, in much of the existing literature it is unclear 
what “automatic” actually means. Their critique ranges across a number of writers; 
Iacoboni (2009) uses the word “pre-reflective” (p. 666); Gallese (2001) uses a variety of 
terminology including “implicit and unconscious”; and, whilst not reviewed by 
Corradini and Antonetti (2013), Meltzoff & Decety (2003) also use the word 
“automatic”. PAM – through the perception-action coupling generated by shared 
representations – clarifies the idea of automacity, suggesting a mechanism by which 
this can be achieved, and one through which we can understand resonation.  
Perception begins with the firing of neurons of the perceptual system. These 
neurons are known to fire both during the execution of an action, but, crucially, these 
same neurons fire when the subject perceives another execute an action (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). Thus, when reaching, grasping, or tearing motions are executed, a set 
of neurons fires in the ventral pre-motor cortex (Miall, 2003). This same cluster of 
neurons also fires when these same actions are observed (Miall, 2003; Pellegrino, 
Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). Mirror neurons are not limited to visual 
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information: there is also evidence that these same neurons fire when a specific action 
is heard as well as performed and seen (Kohler, et al., 2002). Whilst at the neuronal 
level this research has been carried out in monkeys, the human equivalents of these 
areas have been observed in neuro-imaging studies showing the same activation when 
humans both observe and carry out an action (Buccino, et al., 2001; Decety, 
Chaminade, Grezes, & Meltzoff, 2002).  
Mirror neurons not only code perception, they also reveal that to perceptually 
code an action “is equivalent to internally simulate” this action (Gallese, 2003, p. 174), 
from which understanding may be drawn (Gallese, Eagle, & Migone, 2007; Iacoboni, 
2009). This is clearly an excellent system on which empathy could run; such a system 
could for example rapidly translate the perception of crying, an action, or sobbing, a 
sound, into the understanding the person being perceived is unhappy. So mirror 
neurons couple perception and action; because one perceives an action, one can 
understand the meaning of that action because one reproduces this action in the self, 
this reproduction being associated with the meaning of this action. Whilst empathy is 
of course a more complex phenomenon than action-recognition, we can see it nascent 
in the mirror neuron system. Equally, we can see in this system the genesis of the term 
“resonation”. By this rationale we can misquote Barrett-Lennard, and say that the 
mirror neuron system provides “an immediacy of recognition of the others’ felt 
experiencing and meaning” (Barrett-Lennard, 1993, p. 6). To explore this further, we 
move to the behavioural level of explanation.  
At the behavioural level, the mirror neuron system is respresented as motor 
empathy, more specifically as mimicry (Iacoboni, 2009). Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
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have studied what they have come to call the “Chameleon effect”, defining this as “a 
non-conscious mimicry of the postures, mannerisms, facial expressions and other 
behaviour of one’s interaction partners” (1999, p. 893). Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
conducted three experiments looking at mimicry. In the first experiment, confederates 
rubbed their faces or shook their feet, either while smiling or keeping their faces 
neutral. Regardless of the smiling, participants in the research increased their 
frequency of face rubbing or foot shaking to a robustly statistically significant level, 
they also increased smiling in the presence of the smiling confederate. In the second 
experiment, the confederate either mirrored participants’ body language or did not; 
those participants who were mirrored showed increased liking rating of the 
confederate, and increased ratings of the “smoothness” of the interaction. Most 
interestingly, the third experiment used the Interpersonal Reactivity Index – a measure 
of empathy – to group participants into high-perspective takers and low-perspective 
takers.  The high perspective-taking group mimicked mannerisms of confederates 
more than the low-perspective takers. In an experiment that was perhaps more 
concrete still, van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, and Knippenberg, (2003) found that 
waitresses mimicking customers increased both how often a waitress was tipped, and 
how much she was tipped. Outside of the chameleon-effect research stream, mimicry 
of facial expressions has been shown to both take place unconsciously and 
automatically (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Hess & Blairy, 2001); this latter 
finding is arguably based on movements both more subtle and complex than foot 
shaking and eye rubbing. Clear evidence then that mimicry not only has an effect on 
affiliation – robust enough to generate financial reward – but is not confined to simple 
body movements.  
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A brief lexical detour is necessary at this juncture. Mimicry is the copying of a 
motor action without the ability to modify it; imitation is motor copying, plus the 
ability to modify this behaviour (Williams, Nicholson, Clephan, de Grauw, & Perrett, 
2013). Although the mimicry literature reviewed above is clearly relevant, Meltzoff and 
Moore (1983) studying imitation, provide another link between empathy and action. 
Meltzoff and Moore (1983) looked at infants between 42 minutes of age and 72 hours 
of age; infants this young were shown to be able to imitate two facial expressions 
shown to them by adults. Building on this evidence – and many further studies of 
infant mimicry and imitation – Meltzoff and Decety (2003) posit that “Imitation is 
innate in humans”, and further that “behavioural imitation and its neural substrate 
provide the mechanism by which theory of mind and empathy develop in humans” 
(2003, p. 491). They argue that imitation provides the “missing link” between mirror 
neurons and theory of mind/mentalising. The infant comes to know their own body 
and facial expressions through proprioception; infants can then link self and other 
behaviour through supramodal representation of bodily acts: memory representation 
of adult actions which can be compared to their own actions. This mechanism is 
extremely similar to PAM, both models relying on an automatic activation of a memory 
schema, or representation, of both an action and associated emotion. Such a 
mechanism integrates bodily movement, and higher cognitive function seamlessly, 
allowing for a much more embodied idea of cognition, one that has wide-ranging 





Whilst much of the above reviewed literature points to the existence of 
separate elements of the empathic process, all these areas interlink and effect each 
other (Duan & Hill, 1996). Thus, whilst it can enhance our understanding to talk about 
separate elements of empathy, and examine their properties individually, it is 
important to recognise that at higher levels of explanation these separate elements 
become redundant. This said, the final part of the empathy quartet – resonance, or the 
mirror/motor empathy system – can be argued to coalsce the entire structure of 
empathy, allowing for some fluidity between the demarcated elements, and an 
integration of levels of explanation. For this to happen, the ideas of Gallese (2001; 
2003) must be bought to bear. 
Gallese suggests that empathy is a “shared manifold” and that mirror neurons 
are  “a neural basis of intersubjectivity” (2003, p. 171), something that both aligns with 
the PAM, and works across a number of levels of explanation. Gallese (2003) argues 
that the shared manifold of intersubjectivity (SMI) is an intersubjectivity mechanism 
within the human (brain). Where other authors (e.g. Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 
2002) refer to intersubjectivity as a phenomenon that happens between humans, 
Gallese (2003) underlays intersubjectivity with a putative neural mechanism. The SMI 
can therefore explain intersubjectivity – an important part of the empathic milieu – 
across the levels of explanation: working on a phenomenological level; a functional 
level; and a sub-personal level. At the sub-personal level, we have the neuronal 
circuitry that underpins both social identity and empathy. Social behaviour/actions 
have meaning written into them: they are “implicitly meaningful” (Gallese, 2003, p. 
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177) because of the nature of mirror neurons. At the functional level, Gallese argues 
(2003) that the SMI accounts for “as if” models of interaction. These represent self and 
other, allowing the creation of separateness and alikeness. Thus when perceiving, 
individuals know that others are “like me” as they act and look like me, but they are 
“not me” as these actions and looks are not being commanded by me.  At the 
phenomenological level, the SMI gives the sense of similarity between ourselves and 
others, enabling empathy through the sharing of actions, experiences and emotions. 
The SMI represents therefore a conceptual tool that can provide integration across 
levels of knowledge, and indeed places the mirror system as the central component of 
the empathic process.  If we apply Gallesse’s model (2001; 2003) to our discussion so 
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Figure 1 begins at the evolutionary level of explanation; the level of explanation 
that is beyond the remit of Gallese’s model (2003), but which is the next level in the 
hierarchy of knowledge. From the perspective of PAM, humanity is bonded by their 
underlying brain mechanisms; that humans are linked at a neuronal level, is the ultimate 
cause of the evolved tendencies manifesting as altruistic behaviour. This is represented 
by the blue arrow flowing from empathy to evolution, labelled “altruism”. The shared 
manifold is represented by the green dotted line around all elements of empathy, across 
all levels of explanation below evolutionary. As can be seen, the shared manifold holds 
within it both humans’ social processes and identity (in beige), and personal identity and 
processes (in grey). Social and personal processes/identity are separated by the dashed 
red line. It is dashed to represent the idea that personal and social processes are 
interrelated, that the boundary to the self is a relational one, and that therefore it is 
permeable and flexible.  
Within social processes – the beige area – we have three elements that are 
relevant to this model: folk psychology; interpersonal; and objective empathy. All of these 
will require at least some cognising and are therefore connected to cognitive empathy, 
albeit indirectly in the case of interpersonal empathy. Interpersonal empathy draws on 
subjective empathy, folk psychology and, in professional settings, objective empathy. 
Because cause and effect in these areas are complex and inter-related, they are 
represented by a two-way red arrows. Both interpersonal and objective empathy interact 
with subjective empathy; this latter is a personal process, and therefore sits inside the 
grey part with the four elements of the empathy quartet.  
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At the bottom of this quartet underlying all empathic processes is the mirror 
neuron system, synonymous with motor empathy, connected to the functional levels of 
empathy by resonance, mimicry and imitation. Whilst resonance, mimicry, and imitation 
are arguably the same things at a phenomenological level, they have been labelled 
separately for the sake of the functional level of explanation. Emotion regulation is 
depicted as the two blue dashed lines separating the mirror neuron system and other 
empathic elements. This line is dashed to represent the idea that emotion regulation is – 
as with identity – a permeable and flexible concept. Figure 1 not only depicts the 
literature reviewed so far, showing how the four empathy prerequisites – the quartet – 
relate to each other, and to other empathy ideas, it also allows us to begin to draw the 
distinction between professional and personal empathy. In order to elucidate the far right 
column of figure 1 – labelled Professional Empathy – we now turn to look at what the 
literature says and implies in this realm. This understanding will then lead us to how facial 
expression of emotion might be used to enhance professional empathy. 
Professional Differentiation 
The first point to be made is a more philosophical point; by embodying empathy, 
the shared manifold and PAM, allow us to move away from the Cartesian dualism often 
associated with classical psychological models (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002). The 
idea that humans have a “we-centric” (Gallese, 2003, p. 175) space within themselves 
gives foundations to such relational terms as: “interpersonal empathy” (Clarke, 2010) and 
the “intersubjective field” (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002, p. 9). Arguably mirror 
neurons instantiate the intersubjective field, providing counselling psychology with an 
interesting literature on which a number of the more relational models are founded, and 
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integrate their ideas across the levels of explanation. The critique that counsellors rely on 
“extrasensory perception” (Buie, 1981, p. 284) is answered by the mirror neuron system 
and its effects on empathy, one of the aims of this thesis. Less philosophically, we now 
move on to look at the concrete differences between personal empathy and the 
professional application of empathy that the literature reveals. There are 7 differences, 
each relating to different facets of personal empathy, and each alluded to in the colour 
scheme of figure 1. To clarify, the first distinction made below – between personal and 
professional empathy – is the level to which empathy needs to be informed and 
imaginative. In the professional empathy column in figure 1 Informed and Imaginative is 
shown in purple, the same colour as Cognitive Empathy in the personal empathy column. 
Emotionally Boundaried in figure 1 is depicted in light blue, the same colour as Emotion 
Regulation and Self Identity – again, relating these to each other. Communication, 
Temporally Sustained, and Instrumental and Facilitative are depicted in beige, the colour 
of the Social Processes in figure 1, again signifying the interpersonal element of these 
professional facets of empathy.  
Cognitively Informed & Imaginative 
Although the personal use of empathy is informed by previous experience with 
others, and through reading literature (Mar et al., 2006), an important difference with 
professional empathy is the extent to which it is informed. Clark (2010) makes the point 
in his model that objective empathy may be informed by many sources. Objective 
empathy may draw on questionnaires, diagnostic guides, more general research papers 
and theoretical models. This last information channel, the theoretical model, is what Buie 
(1981) refers to as “conceptual empathy”, the ability to form a “model” (p. 297) of the 
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clients’ distress through empathic communication. Radenovic (2011) calls for an 
“advanced understanding of emotions” which she sees as a “necessary condition” (p. 487) 
for understanding others.  So it seems that a counsellor’s cognitive empathy should be 
informed, girded with knowledge; this brought to bear to help empathically understand 
the world of the client.  
Furthermore, within the literature there are a number of advocates of using 
imagination when trying to empathise with clients. This idea can perhaps trace its 
antecedents to Freud’s evenly suspended attention (Epstein, 1984), or Bion’s reverie 
(Cwik, 2011), both of which call for the counsellor to try to curtail ordinary thinking, and 
allow for the clients’ words to conjure in them what they will. Associating this more 
explicitly with the empathic process, Buie (1981), and Clarke (2010), advocate the use of 
“imagination” when trying to empathise with the client; and whilst writing from a medical 
perspective, Anne-Scott (1997) sees imagination as critical when bringing together the 
perception of the patient, and thinking about them. Moreover, Mearns and Thorne 
(2007) when writing about enhancing empathy, argue that imagination is essential if 
counsellors are to develop their empathic ability. Thus, professional empathy requires an 
informed foundation, and an imaginative frame of mind; in the words of Mearns and 
Thorne (2007) “Parochialism is the enemy of empathy” (p. 50). 
Emotionally Boundaried 
As mentioned above, a key distinction to make when looking at professional 
empathy, is that between empathy and sympathy. Whilst it is perhaps true to say that in 
vernacular terms this distinction is not particularly important, it is for counsellors. Mearns 
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and Thorne (2007) are blunt about this: “empathy should not be confused with 
sympathy”, making the distinction that sympathy requires one to be “compassionately 
moved”, but that empathy requires “seeing the world” through the others’ eyes (p. 49). 
Not only are these quite different phenomena, the latter necessitates the individual being 
able to  regulate, and relatedly, disambiguate emotion. In order to see the world from the 
other’s perspective, emotions elicited by the other must be distinguishable from those 
elicited by the self.  
If one is to try to temper one’s “compassion”, whilst at the same time differentiate 
the felt sense of the other from the felt sense of the self, emotion regulation, a key 
member of the empathy quartet, is essential. Going further, if the counsellor wishes to 
tune into the client, whilst preventing injury to the self, they require a “special” form of 
attention, an “empathic attention set” (Barrett-Lennard, 1993, p. 4). This necessitates the 
empathiser’s “active openness” to the other (Barrett-Lennard, 1993, p. 3); and herein lies 
an important paradox of emotion regulation in counselling. The counsellor seeks to be 
open, to allow themselves to resonate with the clients’ feelings, whilst also maintaining 
the integrity of their own self. Openness to the  client without regulation may result in 
vicarious trauma or burnout (Trippany, White Kress, & Wilcoxon, 2004; Sexton, 1999). 
Knowledge of the self at a fundamental level, both cognitively and emotionally, seems to 
be driven by the professional’s connection to representations and shared representations 
of certain perceptions and their resultant actions. Strengthening these connections at the 
neuronal level, which presumably are subject like all others in the brain to managed 
Hebbian learning (McClelland, 2006), is a matter of repeated revisiting of the connections 
and their associated representations. At a functional level this will require exploring 
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certain patterns of emotions and what they touch in you; at a phenomenological level this 
is “to have highly sophisticated self-reflection and self-understanding” (Radenovic, 2011, 
p. 487).  
However, extrapolating from the model outlined above, perception-action coding 
within a shared manifold suggests that self-other understanding is symbiotic, or what 
Radenovic (2011) calls “co-determined” (p. 489). It follows that to understand the self is 
to begin to understand the other, and importantly, vice-versa: to understand the other is 
to understand the self. The therapist must then not only seek “personal growth” (Elliott, 
Watson, Goldman, & Greenberg, 2003), but should also remain open to what the client 
elicits in them (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002). Personal growth may be through 
therapy, political engagement or work on their own relationships (Elliott et al., 2003); it 
will also be useful to read fiction (Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Paz, & Peterson, 2006) and 
develop methods of grounding the self (Geller & Greenberg, 2002). Grounding (Miller, 
1981) or anchoring (Rothschild, 2000) – i.e. the ability to “feel centred steady and whole” 
(Geller & Greenberg, 2002, p. 81) in the self – is an important part of the more micro 
facilitation of self-identity and maintaining emotional boundaries. Personal therapy, 
reading fiction, and so on, are all more long-term methods of developing the self and 
exploring emotional boundaries; grounding techniques can be used imediately before the 
session, and even during the session.  
Communication 
Another important difference between professional and personal empathy is the 
need to communicate it. In wider society, empathic concern, which may also merge with 
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sympathy, may often go unexpressed. It is not difficult to imagine times when friends and 
aquaintances tell each other distressing or personal things. In such situations, they will 
tend to give each other advice, say “I’m sorry to hear that”, or recount a tale of similar 
content. These kinds of interactions, the tooing and froing of distress/happiness and 
advice, are a mainstay of personal conversation. In these circumstances, empathy 
underlies the conversants’ reactions and responses to comments, but the content is 
unlikely be an emotional reflection, or a summary of the distress.  
Professional empathy requires more open communication of emotional content; 
the felt sense is not merely translated into the counsellor’s advice or recollection, but is 
expressed in some way. Rogers (1956) was a clear advocate of this, and in fact made it 
one of the necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic change. Barrett-Lennard’s 
(1993); Clarke (2010); Elliott, Bohart, Watson, and Greenberg, (2011), Kohut (1984), and 
Mearns and Thorne (2007) all advocate the communication of empathic concern as a part 
of professional empathic process. Perhaps this is why in Carlozzi et al’s (2002) study of 
counsellor endorsements of empathy definitions, “Communicative process: a 
communicative process of experiencing and responding to another who then feels 
understood” (Carlozzi et al., 2002, p. 164), was one of only two – of five – factors retained 
when seeking to discriminate empathy definitions. There has been much debate as to 
exactly how this overt communication of empathy should take place, and over the value 
and utility of empathic reflections (Freire, 2007; Mearns & Thorne, 2007; Rogers, 1975). 
However, it certainly seems agreed that overt communication is an important part of the 




The ability to empathise over time is a critical facet of professional empathy that 
separates it from the more personal usage. Again, where empathy is used in a more 
quotidian way, it will tend to be fleeting and unfocused. Someone will “get a sense” or 
“have a feeling” or any other of a number of ways in which people describe the sensation 
of “picking up on” another’s emotions.  Professionally though, whilst such fleeting 
circumstances occur, they are a part of the wider empathic process that takes place over 
a number of time frames: the fleeting short term; the sessional medium term; and the 
contractual long term. In other words, professional empathy can be a momentary sense, 
but it is also the weaving together of these moments in a session, and over the duration 
of the client contact, that separates professional and personal empathy.   
This distinction is perhaps best encapsulated in Rogers’s (1975) idea that empathy 
is a “Process rather than a state” (p. 2); empathy should be ongoing and try to stay as 
close as possible to the clients “flow” of experiencing. Clark’s (2010) interpersonal 
empathy describes this empathy over time, and Buie’s (1981) conceptual empathy – 
explained above – explicitly mentions that this form of empathy will only arise over time. 
Goldberg (2011) sees sustained empathy as both a quantitative difference in professional 
use of empathy, and qualitative difference as well. Goldberg (2011) argues that by 
sustaining empathy the counsellor may be “used” by the client as a self-object, ultimately 
leading to self-integration.  
Whilst an explanation steeped deeply in self-psychology’s theoretical 
understanding of the structure of the psyche, it chimes with Kohut’s later understanding 
that empathy was intrinsically part of the psychotherapy “cure” (Kohut, 1982) and 
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Rogers’s notion that empathy is a necessary and sufficient condition of therapeutic 
change (Rogers, 1956). Barrett-Lennard (1993) talks about “second-order…empathy-like 
awareness” (p. 9) that arises out of the relationship, temporally sustained, with the client; 
this awareness he calls “meta-empathy” and “relationship-systems empathy”. The former 
is the ability to discern (or not) the other’s experience of your empathic understanding; 
the latter, is the understanding of the we-ness of the relationship and how empathy is 
being communicated and experienced in that space. For both of these to occur, empathy 
must be sustained over time. 
Instrumental & Facilitative 
The final difference between professional and personal empathy that the 
literature points to is the difference between facilitation and instrumentalism. 
Professionally and personally empathy is facilitative, that is to say it facilitates social 
interaction and social bonding (De Waal, 2008). However, professional empathy is used in 
an instrumental way as well. It is not simply a way of oiling the social machine, but also – 
theoretically – part of the process by which a client can come to achieve what they came 
to therapy to do. Rogers (1956) and the person-centred tradition (for example: Freire, 
2007; Mearns & Cooper, 2005; Wilkins, 2003) are quite clear about empathy’s 
instrumental role in achieving client growth, the psychoanalytic tradition too has it’s 
empathy advocates in Kohut and Goldberg, and latterly the CBT model has begun to see 
empathy as more than simply facilitative of the client-professional relationship (Thwaites 
& Bennett-Levy, 2007).  
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If we bring the above together and overlay it onto a single professional model, we can 
see how all the above 6 factors relate to the professional setting; to do this Barrett-
Lennard’s (1993) model of empathy is of great utility, and is delineated below. 
a. Empathic attention set in empathizer + object self expression 
b. Phase 1: Empathic resonance in empathizer 
c. Phase 2: Empathizer expresses empathy 
d. Phase 3: Object receives this  
e. feedback loop to phase 1. 
Barrett-Lennard’s model (1993)  begins with the idea that empathy requires an 
empathic attention set, coupled with the clients expressing something to be empathised 
with. This empathic attention set can be conceptualised within the current framework as 
beginning before the counsellor has even met the client; by ensuring that they are fit to 
practice (Code of Ethics and Conduct, 2009), have developed a strong sense of self, and 
are sufficiently grounded in themselves. Moreover, the counsellors attention set will 
require putting in place the necessary emotional boundaries to sustain themselves and 
the client, whilst also allowing their imagination to flow freely, in a state of evenly 
suspended attention.  
In Phase 1, the counsellor “resonates experientially” to the object in “an immediacy of 
recognition of the other’s felt experiencing and meaning” (Barrett-Lennard, 1993, p. 6). 
Here there is then a need for cognitive empathy to be as broad and informed as possible 
– to allow the highest level of resonation; there will also begin the need for temporal 
sustainment to be present, allowing the counsellor to start to develop their empathic 
knowledge over time. In Phase 2 “communicative expression” of the empathizers phase 1 
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response is called for; Barrett-Lennard (1993)  specifically excludes sympathy from this 
phase as it is “possible that this arousal stems from a reminder of his/her own suffering 
(or joys) to a degree” (p. 6). This latter point an overt reminder of the importance of 
remaining emotionally boundaried, whilst also calling for the communication of empathy.  
In Phase 3: expressing empathy – rather than sympathy or simple reflection – allows 
phase 3: this is “being literally heard and understood deeply in some personally vital 
sphere” providing “relief, or something making sense, a feeling of inner connection one of 
being less alone, or of some easing or enhancing quality” (Barrett-Lennard, 1993, p. 6).  
Again here we have the critical distinction between sympathy and empathy, but we also 
see a final facet of professional empathy in the statement that empathy will bring an 
“easing or enhancing quality” (Barrett-Lennard, 1993, p. 6).  
Within the literature there is evident some broad levels of agreement as to what 
empathy is, and indeed how professional empathy may separate itself from its more 
personal manifestation. We have also reviewed literature that defines empathy as 
founded in, and arising from, resonation or the mirror neuron system. From the centrality 
of the mirror neuron system it follows that the face – via mimicry and imitation – is of 
critical importance to the communication of emotion and therefore empathy. Below, the 
literature relating the face to the empathic process is now reviewed, with a specific focus 
on the work of Paul Ekman, whose eMETT was part of the inspiration for this research.  
Facial Communication 
In 1971 Paul Ekman and his colleague Wallace Friesen published their 
neurocultural theory of emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). This theory was built on work 
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done by Ekman and colleagues in the late 60’s and early 70’s studying both western 
cultures and non-western cultures (Ekman, 2003); and posited the universality of emotion 
and its facial display in humans. Importantly for the soundness of the theory, remote 
“non-literate cultures” had been studied; specifically the Fore (Ekman & Friesen, 1971) 
and Dani (Ekman, 1994) of New Guinea. These populations had not been exposed to any 
western media and the possible homogenising effects this may have. The neurocultural 
theory is founded on evidence for the universality of the emotions: fear; anger; surprise; 
disgust; sadness, and happiness (Ekman, 1994). This evidence – for the initial 6 emotions 
– has been in replicated in at least 30 countries (Russell, 1994), though it is not beyond 
critique (see for example: Russell, 1994). Experimental work has argued that contempt 
(Ekman, 2003b) and shame (Keltner, 1997) can be added to the initial list of 6, though 
these emotions have not been replicated as widely or consistently.  
Ekman and Friesen’s (1969) theory postulates that there is a set of facial affect 
programs, and that these programs produce visible facial behaviour – or facial 
expressions of emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1969b). These programs are pancultural, and 
therefore facial expressions of emotion are universal across humanity; however, cultural 
variability moderates and modifies the visible facial displays in two key ways. The first is 
that different cultures will relate to different “affect antecedents” in different ways. An 
example of this might be the Yulin dog-meat festival, a delicacy eliciting happiness in 
some; a travesty worthy of contempt or disgust for others. The second is display rules, 
whereby different cultures will amplify, moderate, or mask different emotions in different 
ways; for example the British “stiff-upper lip” at a funeral, verses Arab ululation. A more 
recent take on this suggests that there is a universal facial language – specific affect 
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programs – with cultural display differences being classed as dialects (Elfendein & 
Ambady, 2003). Display rules are an important part of the work on facial communication 
of emotion as they will often lead to the suppression of emotion; however, such 
suppression is rarely complete (Ekman, 2003a).  
“Micromomentary expressions” (Haggard & Isaacs, 1966, p. 154) – latterly known 
as “microexpressions” (Ekman & Friesen, 1969a, p. 93) – are a form of emotional 
“leakage” that will occur when humans try to supress the facial expression that may be 
appropriate to the felt emotion but which they don’t want to show. This suppression will 
either be to conform to display rules, or for more personal reasons. An example of the 
former might be to show a neutral face at a funeral – supressing your sadness – and the 
latter might be to supress the facial expression of fear at a horror movie to impress upon 
your friends you’re a “real man”. Leakage – in the form of microexpressions – may occur, 
as a brief flash of sadness at the funeral, or fear at the film. These brief flashes – 
microexpressions – are often scintillas of the emotion felt, and last less than half a second 
(Matsumoto & Sung Hwang, 2011), as compared to “macroexpressions” – the full facial 
expression of emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1969a, p. 93) – which last 2 seconds or more 
(Hess & Kleck, 1997). 
In order to carry out the cross cultural research, and replication, Ekman and 
collegues created emotional archetypes, or the most extreme and complete 
macroexpression of an emotion; these have come to be known as “Ekman faces”. 
Examples of Ekman faces can be found in  Ekman and Friesen’s  2003 book “Unmasking 
the Face”,  though as Ekman (2003b) himself points out, emotions are rarely shown as 
extremely, or as singularly as they are in the Ekman faces. Emotions tend to be subtle 
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blends, or partial leakage of fragments of the full macroexpression depicted in the Ekman 
face. Ekman faces began as pictures, but latterly these static displays have been replaced 
with programs designed to teach microexpression recognition; an example being the 
Microexpression Recognition Training Tool developed by Matsumoto and Sung Hwang 
(2011).  
Microexpression training has generally focused on deception detection (Navarro & 
Karlins, 2008; ten Brinke & Porter, 2013) for which there is evidence that it has efficacy 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; ten Brinke, MacDonald, Porter, & O'Connor, 2012). Trial 
consultants (Matsumoto & Sung Hwang, 2011), law enforcement officers (Navarro & 
Karlins, 2008), parole officers (Porter, Woodworth, & Birt, 2000), and insurance claim 
handlers (Porter, Juodis, ten Brinke, Klien, & Wilson, 2010) have all been successfully 
taught microexpression recognition. Outside of the legal system, business professionals 
(Ekman, 2009) and shop assistants have been taught to recognise microexpressions 
(Matsumoto & Sung Hwang, 2011); moreover, Ekman’s own Microexpression Training 
Tool (eMETT) has been independently validated for the teaching of microexpressions in a 
student population (Hurley, 2012).   
The purported universality of facially expressed emotion, and the feasibility of 
enhancing emotion perception through training, are perhaps reasons why facial 
communication is “increasingly popular” (Regenbogen & Habel, 2015, p. 107) in both 
social cognitions research, and – more narrowly – empathy research. It is this research to 
which we now turn. 
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Empathy and the Face 
A recent study which serves to underlie the importance of the face in empathic 
perception is one carried out by Regenbogen et al (2012). In Regenbogen et al (2012) 
video clips of actors telling a story related to themselves were played to participants. 
These stories varied in the material discussed, whereby the story involved disgusted, 
fearful, happy, sad or neutral emotional valence. Each emotion was then delivered in a 
variety of conditions; in the “all emotional” condition, facial expressions, prosody, and 
speech content were congruent with the emotion in question. In the other conditions, a 
single element of the communication content was “knocked out”, thus there was a 
neutral face, neutral prosody, and neutral speech video. In the “neutral condition” 
emotions would continue to be shown in the other channels but would be knocked out in 
the relevant channel. For example, in the neutral prosody condition, the face would 
continue to be expressive as well as the speech, but the prosody was removed and the 
same words dubbed over with a neutral sounding voice stream which had been recorded 
separately. Participants were asked to fill out multiple choice questions (MCQ) on the 
emotion they felt in response to the video, the emotion they felt was being expressed, 
and were also monitored for galvanic skin response (GSR) to the emotion depicted in the 
video. Results showed that neutralising a communication channel reduced GSR to the 
emotion, reduced the MCQ scores both for the emotion felt in the self, and perceived in 
the other. The reduction in scores for emotion recognition was most pronounced in the 
neutral face condition (Regenbogen, et al., 2012).  
Another study which underlies the relationship between empathy and the face is 
that by Williams et al (2013). In this experiment, static displays of emotion were created 
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by morphing model displays of emotion – based on Ekman faces (Ekamn & Friesen, 2003) 
– from one emotion to another in emotion triumvirates. These morphing pictures were 
created by placing the archetypal emotions at the vertices of a triangle, with the emotion 
displayed on the face morphing across the three pictures between each vertex. Two 
emotion morphing triangles were used: a Sadness-anger-surprise (SAS) triangle; and a 
fear-happiness-disgust (FHD) triangle. Participants were asked to imitate the emotions 
shown in all pictures produced by the morphing process. Empathy quotient (EQ) 
(Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004) scores correlated negatively with 
error scores on the imitation task on the SAS array but not the FHD. Williams et al (2013) 
account for this discrepancy in their result with the task difficulty of the FHD triangle; 
however, in a replication and neuroimaging extension of the original research 
(Braadbaart, de Grauw, Perrett, Waiter, & Williams, 2014), the FHD triangle correlated 
with the EQ. Braadbaart et al’s (2014) study also showed activation of the mirror neuron 
system when subjects were imitating facial expressions. This correlation mismatch 
between the two studies clearly requires further investigation, but it is an interesting 
pointer in the direction of the current studies hypothesis, outlined below.  
In a forensic population, convicted sex offenders show decreased rates of affective 
empathy, and decreased ability to recognise facial displays of anger, disgust, surprise and 
fear, with a positive correlation between the empathy and face recognition accuracy 
(Gery, Miljkovitch, Berthoz, & Soussignan, 2009). Within the psychology profession, 
research has not directly linked facial expressions and empathy, though there are a 
number of findings that are certainly suggestive. The first is a study by Maurer and Tindall 
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(1983) who studied the effect of postural congruence on Barrett-Lennard Relationship 
Inventory (BLRI).  
Postural congruence is the mirrored mimicry of body language; and Maurer and 
Tindall’s (1983) experiment compared conditions in which counsellors were posturally 
congruent with their clients, and conditions in which they weren’t. The counsellors who 
were posturally congruent were rated by clients as significantly more empathic on the 
BLRI than those who weren’t. This finding is clearly in line with the previously reviewed 
literature on mimicry, and whilst it is related to body language rather than facially 
expressed affect, it nonetheless points in the directon of empathic enhancement through 
such mimicry. Two other studies have shown that facial expressions of emotion are 
related to psychotherapy outcome (Banninger-Huber, 1992; Merten, Anstadt, Ullrich, 
Krause, & Buchheim, 1996); and whilst there is no causative relationship suggested, it 
certainly adds to the idea that the face is not simply an important communication channel 
for personal empathy. 
Above, it has been argued that the face is both an important communication 
channel, and more precisely, a communication channel of empathy. If we are to see 
whether this relationship can affect empathic ability, we need a measure of this ability; 





Whilst it is not a central aim of this thesis to delimit and describe the wide variety 
of measures of empathy, a brief exegesis will serve to contextualise the choice of 
measure used in this research. As wide ranging reviews of empathy measures have 
already been conducted by a number of different research groups: (see Duan and Hill 
(1996); Elliott et al (2011); Eisenberg and Lennon (1983)), findings from these reviews will 
be summarised below rather than replicated.  
Elliot et al. (2011) outline 4 broad categories of empathy measure: observer rated 
empathy, client ratings, therapist ratings, and empathic accuracy, to which Duan and Hill 
(1996) add physiological measures.  A wide array of client and therapist ratings have been 
produced (Duan & Hill, 1996; Elliot et al., 2011); examples include the empathy quotient 
and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index; and more recently the Questionnaire of Cognitive 
and Affective Empathy. Although validated, such measures tend to suffer from social 
desirability bias (Duan & Hill, 1996; Stangor, 2007), a facet of these measures clearly 
highlighted in research on gender differences in empathy.  
A much vaunted difference in empathic ability has been suggested to exist 
between men and women; importantly though, this sex difference is most pronounced in 
self-report measures, and disappears when empathy is measured unobtrusively or 
physiologically (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). This weakness in the use of self-report 
measures is lent further credibility when considering findings from the Empathic Accuracy 
paradigm.  This paradigm – detailed further below – revealed no sex differences in 
empathic accuracy between men and women, except when the participant response form 
explicitly stated that the test in question was concerned with empathy (Ickes, 2003). 
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Another aspect of such measures that has led Duan and Hill (1996) to describe findings 
based on them as “questionable” is the propensity for “human perception errors” (p. 
264); to whit an individual may think that they have understood, or been understood by 
another, but in fact this may be untrue. This seems to point to the conclusion that 
questionnaire measures of empathy, or therapist ratings, should be treated with caution. 
This maybe especially so for therapists, who arguably have a greater desire be empathic 
and therefore biased in their self-report. Observer-rated empathy, whilst able to 
circumvent biases within the individual, suffers from a lack of validity as it can be 
confounded by the therapists’ communication ability (Duan & Hill, 1996) and 
paralinguistic practices (Elliott et al., 2011). Moreover, this type of measure would seem 
to fall prey to the latter critique of the self-report measures, though rather than the 
perception error affecting the subject or object of empathy, it simply effects the third 
party rater.  
Physiological measures including electrodermal activation (Mauss, Levenson, 
McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005) and heart rate (Levenson & Ruef, 1992)  have also 
been used to study empathy. Whilst these measures lack the subjective issues outlined 
above, they are also subject to critique. In terms of skin conductance, whilst this has been 
extensively used, it is a somewhat crude measure of empathy, relying on a high level of 
abstraction, the same can be said of heart rate. Empathy has also been extensively 
studied with fMRI (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; 
Hurlemann, et al., 2010). The jury is still very much out on the statistical practices of much 
neuroscience work (Vul, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009) though see Lieberman, Berkman 
and Wager (2009) for a riposte. Indeed there is much controversy as to whether “the 
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where” in the brain, can necessarily be linked to “the what” of the brain (Coltheart, 2006). 
Again, see Henson (2006) for an alternative view. Whilst a “time consuming” 
methodology (Elliott, Bohart, Watson, & Greenberg, 2011, p. 4), the empathic accuracy 
paradigm may avoid many of the issues outlined above. 
The Empathic Accuracy Paradigm  
William Ickes developed the empathic accuracy paradigm (EAP) (Ickes, 2001) 
which has spawned a number of research findings and extensions for over 20 years of 
research (Ickes, 2009). The EAP was originally used to assess the variations in empathy in 
dyadic interactions in couples with varying levels of intimacy: comparing strangers and 
friends (Colvin, Vogt, & Ickes, 1997), dating partners (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonette & Garcia, 
1990), mixed and same sex pairings (Ickes, 2003).  
The EAP begins with the secret filming of two people whilst they are in a room 
ostensibly waiting for the experimenter to arrive. After the waiting is over, the partners in 
the dyad are told they have been secretly filmed and asked if they would like to take part 
in the next part of the experiment. If they agree, each partner from the original dyad 
views the secretly shot footage separately, and is asked to stop the video where they can 
remember having had a specific thought or emotion. A critical point here is that the 
partner – now participant – is asked to note down the thought or feeling that they 
remember having during the waiting room interaction, not subsequently whilst viewing 
the footage. Once the participant has made a note of what they were thinking/feeling at 
the first point, the video is restarted and they watch until they remember the next 
thought or feeling they had, when again the video is stopped and note is made.  
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This stopping and annotation process continues until all the footage has been 
watched – separately – by both partners. Once complete, each participant then re-
watches the footage, which is stopped for them at the point their partner – the other 
participant – has made a note. The participant is asked to write down what they think the 
other partner was thinking/feeling at that point. Again, this is an iterative process, the 
participant watching the entire footage and annotating every stop point that the other 
dyad member made. Once complete, both partners are debriefed and the experiment is 
concluded. Raters – blind to the hypothesis – now compare the notes made by each dyad 
member and assign marks for each “match” between what the original partner and what 
the subsequently viewing participant said they thought or felt.    
Raters mark the stop point notes on the following basis: if the content of the 
subsequent viewers notes is “essentially different” to what the initial participant wrote, 
they score 0; if the participants’ inference is “somewhat similar” they score 1, or 
“essentially the same” they score 2. The sum of these scores represents the empathic 
accuracy score (Ickes, 2003), with a sub-score for feelings: the total correct feelings 
identified; and thoughts, i.e. the total correct thoughts identified.    
The EAP is unique in empathy research as it gives the object of the empathic 
inference the ability to record situation specific cognitions and emotions which the 
empathizer must divine. Thus it removes human perception errors found in other 
empathic measures, and equally allows the assessment of empathy without self-report 
bias; it is therefore an objective measure of empathy. The only subjective element to the 
process is in the raters’ marking, a process which is only subjective as far as the phrasal 
qualities of answers is concerned, and provided raters are blind to the hypothesis should 
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remain minimal. Although objective in many ways, the EAP is still subject to memory 
confusion in the footage paticipants; like every measure then it has both advantages and 
disadvantages. On balance, this paradigm is a good way to access participant subjective 
reality, whilst making this available for objective testing. 
More recently the Movie for The assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) (Dzoibek, 
et al., 2006) has been developed. This paradigm uses actors to depict people getting 
ready for a dinner party, each person comes to the dinner party with their own agendas, 
some which are explicit, and some which must be inferred (Dzoibek, et al., 2006). Whilst it 
is a paradigm somewhat similar to the EAP, the EAP remains exceptional as it is 
naturalistic from the outset – the MASC relies on actors to generate the content. 
Moreover, the EAP can be adapted to assess empathy in clinical situations. This has been 
done to examine the effect of feedback on empathic accuracy (Ickes, Maragoni, & Garcia, 
1997), and to assess the effect of a training program on trainee empathy (Barone et al., 
2005). In Barone et al (2005) a client counsellor interaction was filmed and annotated as 
per the EAP instructions above, though only the client in the interaction made notes. 
Participants were Psy.D, Ph.D or Clinical Psychology students, who were tested before 
and after a semester of training, practice hours and teaching. The participants showed a 
shift in empathic accuracy score from pre-semester to post-semester testing.  
Whether using the EAP, or some other measure, it seems empathy is capable of 
some level of quantification, and, as argued above, is central to the psychotherapy 
endeavour. What evidence is there for its susceptibility to training? 
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The Current Study 
As outlined above, a literature search revealed no studies seeking to teach 
empathy within the psychotherapy literature. However, in the medical literature, a single 
study shows that there is efficacy in such training. Riess, Kelley, Bailey, Dunn, and Phillips 
(2012) trained a group of doctors for three hours spread over a month in an intervention 
aimed at enhancing empathy. Riess et al’s (2012) intervention consisted of lectures, skills-
based teaching, and experiential practice to enhance physician emapthy. Arguably this is 
similar to the content of much psychology training, and the training group showed 
significantly greater improvement in patient rated empathy over the control. The 
similarity between the Riess et al (2012) curriculum and the training given to 
psychologists is arguably why such interventions are not used in the psychotherapy 
training program – the programs already achieve these aims (Barone, et al., 2005). 
Moreover, it is arguable that physicians need empathy training, as medical training and 
praticum reduces their empathic capacity (Hojat, et al., 2004; Hojat, et al., 2009; 
Neumann, et al., 2011).  
Another study relevant here is one conducted by Hassenstab, Dziobek, Rogers, 
Wolf, and Convit (2007), who looked at the empathic abilities of a group of 
psychotherapists. The psychologists’ empathic capacity was compared to a group of 
control participants matched for age, education years, and IQ. The results of interest, 
were the differences between the psychologists and matched controls on the MASC and 
the Ekman Faces test. The MASC test is designed to test participants ability to infer the 
mental state of others in a normal social interation, and has subscales relating to verbal 
content and non-verbal content—facial expressions and body language. The MASC 
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showed a statistically significant result between the psychotherapists and the matched 
controls, but only on the verbal subscale, the Ekman faces test showed no significant 
difference. From these results Hassenstab et al (2007) conclude that psychotherapists 
have an empathic advantage, but that this advantage does not derive from their ability to 
read facial expressions of emotion. Rather, they suggest that therapists are better at 
inferring the mental states of others through the use of subtext within verbal 
communication, and that this is whence they draw their empathic advantage (Hassenstab 
et al., 2007).  
To summarise, the face is critical in the communication of emotion (Regenbogen 
et al., 2012), with correlations shown to exist between empathic traits, and the ability to 
imitate facial expressions of emotion (Gery et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2013; Williams et 
al., 2014). These empirical findings are easily accounted for by a definition of empathy 
which is founded on the mirror neuron system. What these findings, and the current 
definition point to, is an empathic system that is driven by the perception of the face, in 
much the same way as language is driven by the perception – hearing – of words.  If we 
combine this empathic system with the evidence showing that training in how emotion is 
expressed on the face can enhance emotion recognition (Hurley, 2008; Matsumoto & 
Sung Hwang, 2011), a rationale for this study is apparent. Moreover, the knowledge that 
psychotherapists have an empathic advantage, but that this does not derive from their 
abillity to read the face (Hassenstab et al., 2007) suggests that using eMETT training may 
help this profesional community. Thus, the current study aims to assess whether the 





Although the inspiration for this thesis was a moment in a counselling session, I 
have nonetheless taken a direction guided by underlying philosophical frames, which I 
examine below. My background in psychology is a BSc, which approached psychology as a 
science. This scientific frame was realist, positivist, and relied on evidence garnered using 
the scientific method. This frame was one that had been apparent in my education long 
before my psychology degree. My journey through education, starting in primary, through 
GCSEs and A-levels, had all been framed in the idea that there is a knowable, law-guided, 
objective reality. The neoliberal society in which I have lived all my life is also subject to 
the dominant discourse of positivism. Science, in the realist mould, has achieved societal 
hegemony in a way that could not but have affected my consciousness. I came to do a 
doctorate, though, that challenged this frame; this doctorate was founded in a relational 
model, based as it is on phenomenology and inter-subjective experience.  
The philosophical frame that my education and experience had been based on – 
my preconceptions – was entirely predicated on positivism, asserting that the world was 
known by measurement and observation of this measurement. The only challenge I had 
had to this was in the form of a somewhat rigorous catholic upbringing. Underlying this 
was the notion of god, a being unknowable, only capable of being believed in or not. 
Though not perhaps the most convincing of arguments, this religious presence in my life 
preserved the idea of something beyond measurement. Metaphysics then was a 
quotidian presence; school life consisted of prayers twice a day, mass twice a week, grace 
before every meal, and compulsory religious education till A-level. So whilst many hours 
of the day where spent studying science, economics, history, geography and maths, all 
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based in a primarily realist frame, I still had the unknown presented to me on a daily 
basis. None of the above is to assert that metaphysics and phenomenology are the same 
thing, but there was at least a foundation in my psyche for the idea that not all 
knowledge need come from a “verified” and “valid” source.  
In phenomenology the meaning that experience has to the perceiver is 
epistemologically central. Positivism asserts that when grounded in verifiable data, 
knowledge is to be privileged. Clearly there is a contrast in these positions, but the two 
needn’t be exclusive, despite this epistemological variation. Perhaps an axiomatic stance 
would be grounded in a solipsistic position, asserting that we can know nothing outside 
our own mind.  
Relying on this – my own mind – I assert that I value intelligence, loyalty, 
connection, and pleasure above all other things. Why I do this, is beyond the scope of this 
section, but taking “intelligence” as the germane example, what I mean by this is 
encapsulated best by Bertrand Russell: “The fundamental cause of… trouble is that in the 
modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt” (Russell B. , 
1975, p. 204). This pithy remark reveals an underlying statement: that to seek 
intelligence, one must try to remain unsure. Russell tersely summarises then, that I – for 
perhaps metaphysical reasons, or an entirely explainable set of bio-psychosocial factors – 
aspire to be unsure. Whatever epistemology I adopt, even if it takes me away from 
solipsism, I will always seek to remain unsure, and therefore strive for intelligence. 
Integrating a phenomenological and positivist frame becomes easier when the imperative 
is to be unsure, as they can be reconciled simply by considering both. What this leads to is 
a stance that can be summarised thus: I value subjective experience, but weigh within my 
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subjective experience verifiable findings. Ultimately, by remaining unsure, and therefore 
trying to resist holding onto any one philosophy too tightly, one can combine ideas and 
create new truth.  
If one takes the above outlined position, subjective reality and truth are on some 
level aligned, one can discern a social constructionist view. This idea, that reality can be 
examined from the viewpoint of the socially situated human, fits within a philosophy 
guided by the unsure observer. The first problem when trying to define social 
constructionism: attempting a definition one must take a realist position, something that 
is “profoundly anti-constructionist” (Potter, 1996; pg.125). However, constructionists do 
allow that by acknowledging this, I can show my awareness and thereby continue from a 
realist position. To quote Berger and Luckmann (1966), social constructionism is founded 
in the idea that “reality is socially constructed” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; pg.13) and 
that the world known by humankind “is not required by what there is” (Gergen, 2009; 
pg.5). Rather, the world is constructed by humanity who experience and sense, but they 
also interpret; it is through this interpreting – a social enterprise – that humans construct 
the world (Gergen, 2009). As an example, take the ostensibly axiomatic idea of gender. 
Humans have a genital binary and therefore the human world is split into male and 
female. However, gender is created by a “stylized repetition of acts” (Butler, 1998; pg. 
519) so the “and therefore” in the above sentence is not necessarily true. The existence 
of given genitals does not dictate that humans act in specified ways, don clothes of a 
particular variety, or work in certain industries. Society specifies “stylized acts” for males 
and females, gender is constructed somewhat arbitrarily on the basis of different genitals. 
More concretely, ask a Scotsman why he’s wearing a skirt; he’ll correct you, it’s a Kilt. 
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However, take a kilt to someone from Sierra Leone, they’ll likely tell you it’s a skirt. The 
kilt then has been constructed by Scottish men as a male form of clothing which isn’t a 
skirt, despite the fact that to all intents and purposes a kilt is a skirt. Of course it should be 
added that there is nothing inherently female or male about a skirt, this is another social 
construction. The constructions in society are moulded through discourse – “the building 
blocks of social reality” (Coyle, 2006; pg.368). Discourse – talk or text in society – 
constructs reality, it does not simply reflect reality (Burr, 2003). If we apply the above to 
my thesis, we can re-examine the idea of “an experiment”. 
From a positivist position, an experiment provides data verifiable through the 
scientific method, and therefore, testable truth. Testable truth is seen by a positivist as 
capable of supporting or refuting theory, this is the value of an experiment. From a 
phenomenological view, an experiment is void of subjective validity; it has formed an 
abstraction, one not subject to experience. From a social constructionist point of view, an 
experiment has social meaning: meaning no more valid than other conceptions of reality, 
conceptions which have not been parsed through the algorithm of positivism. However, it 
is also arguable that an experiment is capable of allowing experience to be retrospectively 
validated. Data from such an experiment can be analysed and theoretically positioned, 
and if the results of this experiment are then considered in view of the wider social 
reality, the experiment may be seen as a powerful tool. Powerful because such an 
experiment will have provided subjective validation, positivist data, and an opportunity 
for socially deconstructed awareness. This experimental design would provide a 




In order to create the experiment laid out above, the experimenter must provide a 
design that attempts to measure his reality against that of similar others, and then relate 
this to positivist theory. The hypotheses need to be designed to validate both the 
phenomena experienced by the experimenter, and theory that may explain these 
phenomena. Theory can be drawn from across the levels of explanation, but will be 
strengthened if capable of joining levels of explanation (Mayr, 1961). Results from this 
experiment can then be considered within the wider social context.  
This thesis aims to do exactly this: the literature reviewed provides a comingling of 
epistemology, a positivistic grounding for a phenomenological level of experience. The 
experiment tests phenomena experienced by me – in my relationship with Nancy, – and 
the hypotheses will retrospectively validate – or not – this experience against the 
abstracted reality of others. This provides the most important aspect of the mixed 
method stance; by testing my experience of eMETT training, against the – albeit 
abstracted – experience of other psychotherapy professionals, I have given my positivist 
experiment a phenomenological foundation. Finally, a critical analysis of the results will 
interrogate the reported findings of the experiment, examining them in the light of the 








 In order to realise the aims set out in the Methodology, in line with the literature 
reviewed, the study design married the EAP, with the eMETT, and a training as usual 
control. Below, all elements of this study design are drawn out, starting with the 
hypothesies, then the procedure and design of the experiment. Next, the participants and 
their demographics are described. The ethical considerations of the study are considered, 
and the stimulus film that all participants watched is outlined. The process of choosing, 
recording, editing, and scoring this film is described, along with the tasks that each 
participant group completed. This will complete the methods section, and the results 
obtained from the study will then be presented.  
Hypotheses 
The aim of this study is to test whether eMETT training can enhance empathic 
accuracy; the literature outlined above suggests that this may be the case. The literature 
above argues most strongly that emotional empathy is likely to be enhanced by better 
emotion recognition. However, as the domains of empathic ability – cognitive and 
emotional – are clearly interrelated, there is grounds to argue that cognitive empathy 
may be somewhat enhanced. In recognition of this a hypothesis relating to overall 
empathic accuracy – inclusive of cognitive empathy – has been included in the following 
four research questions: 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
Do participants in the experimental condition achieve a better overall empathic 
accuracy score on the EAP, compared to those allocated to the control condition? 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
Will participants in the experimental condition achieve a better emotional 
empathic accuracy score on the EAP, compared to those allocated to the control 
condition? 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
Can participants in the eMETT group improve their ability to recognise facial 
expressions of emotion? This improvement indexed by an increase in participant eMETT 
score, from pre to post-test. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) 
Is there a positive correlation between emotional empathic accuracy score on the 
EAP and the post training eMETT score for participants in the experimental group? 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually, each participant read the information form, 
and gave informed consent (see Appendix B for a copy of the participant consent form). 
Participants then filled out the demographic and training information forms, as well as 
the QCAE questionnaire, after which each participant was then asked to complete their 
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assigned task. This task was either to read for 40 minutes, or use the eMETT for 40 
minutes. After which, participants then watched the empathic accuracy film whilst 
completing the empathic inference form. Once participants had finished watching the 
stimulus video they were debriefed, and given the opportunity to ask any questions they 
might have; this concluded the experiment. 
 
Figure 2: Schematic of the experimental procedure with approximate timings. 
Design & Statistical Analysis 
The sample for this study was an opportunity sample, drawn from pools of 
participants that where both accessible, and amenable to giving ethical consent. Group 
allocation was stratified convenience allocation, the single baseline variable that was 
controlled (stratified) was the number of men in each group. Whilst there is some 
contention over whether there is a disparity between men and women’s empathic ability 
(see Eisenberg & Lennon, (1983) for a review), it was felt that men should be equally 
1
• Read participant information form ~3 minutes
2
• Fill out consent form ~2 minutes
3
• Demographic, work and QCAE questionnaires ~5 minutes
4
• 40 minutes reading
OR 40 minutes
• 40 minutes eMETT
5
• Empathic accuracy video 23 minutes 5 seconds
6
• Debrief ~2 minutes
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allocated to each group to prevent any biasing effect this may have. The convenience 
allocation was based on two factors outside of the experimenters control, Specifically wifi 
intermittency at one testing site, and the preference of some participants to not do 
eMETT training.  
The experimental design involved a single Independent variable with two levels. 
The independent variable was training type, the levels reading – Treatment as Usual 
(TAU) — and eMETT. This was therefore a between groups design with participants 
conveniently assigned to two even groups – the E-METT group and the TAU group. Group 
differences in age, QCAE score and practice years where tested using independent 
samples T-Test. Independent sample T-test was used to compare means in for the 
empathic accuracy measure. Pearson Chi-Square was calculated to assay practice 
modality differences. 
Participants 
Participants were 60 psychotherapists or trainees with at least one year of 
experience of face-face client work; see Table 1 for the relevant practice, demographic 
and baseline information of each group; participant therapy practice models are shown in 
Table 6. 
Participants were recruited via email and flyers from Roehampton University 
Psychology department, and the Wimbledon Guild of Social Welfare. Participant inclusion 
criteria were that each participant should have a minimum of at least 1 year experience in 
face to face client work; be currently seeing clients on a one to one basis; and be qualified 
to at least diploma level.  
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Part of participant recruitment was a consideration of the time required to 
participate in the experiment. Because participants were not being paid, it was felt that 
total participation time should be limited to an hour, or as close to this as possible. See 
Critical Analysis below for further discussion of this point. 
Table 1: Participant demographic, practice and baseline information.  
  Reading - TAU eMETT p-value 
Sex    
   Female: N (%) 24 (40) 25 (42) n.s. 
   Male: N (%) 6 (10) 5 (8) n.s. 
Age 44.6 (12.6) 37.8 (11.5) 0.03 
   Age Range 26-74 24-69  
QCAE Score    
  Cognitive empathy 60.8 (12.9) 61.5 (6.58) n.s. 
  Affective empathy 31.7 (7.71) 34.3 (4.54) n.s 
Practice years 7.42 (9.37) 5.75 (6.27) n.s. 
Note: All values are means (SD) unless otherwise stated. QCAE: Questionnaire of 
Cognitive and Affective Empathy. 
Ethical Consideration 
This research was carried out with Roehampton University Ethics Committee 
approval, and within the research ethics guidelines of the BPS. 
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All participants in the study, and the video stimuli, gave fully informed consent; 
this was done through the use of the university consent form. No participant received 
remuneration for taking part in the study; however, all participants received a one-year 
licence to computer based training on the eMETT program without charge (usual RRP 
$79: ~£55). This licence was given to all participants regardless of their experimental 
groups, before their participation. This was done to ensure that no participant felt their 
licence allocation was dependent upon participation, and to ensure that each 
experimental group was treated the same.  
All participants were assigned an individual number used in place of their name. 
This number was the identifier in the raw data, and processed data only referred to as 
“participants”, no more specific moniker was used, and certainly no identifying 
information has been provided throughout this study. The list linking names and numbers 
is handwritten, and is filed in a safe in my home office. This list will be destroyed in line 
with those stipulations in data protection act, and BPS code. If published these records 
will be retained for 5 years; if not, one year.  
 The consent form specifically mentioned empathy; the use of stratified sampling, 
ensured that any potential biasing effect of gender – elicited by the use of the word 
empathy (Ickes, 2003), – was compensated for. This allowed the experiment to avoid 
participant deception. As part of the consent form, participants were informed that they 
can withdraw at any time without giving a reason, and that there is no academic necessity 
to take part in the project. Thus, any students enrolled in the study, could decline to 
participate, or withdraw during the experiment, and know their course marks would not 
be adversely affected. Participant information included a debrief, this covered the 
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possibility of emotional distress – noted in the project risk assessment, – and gave details 
of both the researcher, departmental head, and supervisors. For participants outside the 
university, their debrief included details of the head of counselling at Wimbledon Guild, 
and local agencies that might be of use.  
A final, but important ethical consideration raised by this research, was that of 
participants gaining an understanding of how emotion appears on the face; a training that 
would generalise into their domestic lives. This generalisation is potentially problematic, 
for example, if a participant were to catch a spouse or other in deception; deception that 
they identified because of a micro-expression incongruence in a domestic exchange. The 
sort of understanding that micro-expression training confers on those who have 
completed the course is potentially a risk, if it were to engender a situation that would 
not have existed before. Such a situation might put the participant at risk of harm, harm 
arguably attributable to the eMETT training. However, a number of points both mitigate 
this risk, and argue against direct attribution to the experiment. Firstly, in order to use 
eMETT training in deception detection, or other less benign purposes, further specialised 
training is required. The eMETT itself teaches how emotion is shown, not how to analyse 
the gap between what is said, and what emotion revealed on the face: a vital element in 
deception detection. Secondly, this training does not confer a “new” skill, but simply 
enhances and makes conscious a skill that is already present (Regenbogen, et al., 2012). 
Such training, whilst beneficial in a therapeutic boundary, will not necessarily be of use in 
more fluid personal exchanges. Relatedly, eMETT enhances perception, but does not – 
without further training – enable judgement, eMETT is arguably then, of less impact in 
participants’ lives than all other training they have received as psychotherapists. Finally, 
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this training is currently available to all on a commercial basis 
(https://www.paulekman.com/), and is therefore not placing participants in a position 
they could not otherwise be in.   
Stimulus Film 
The empathic accuracy paradigm requires the creation of a stimulus film for 
viewing by participants. The stimulus film was created in line with those instructions 
outlined by the paradigm’s originator William Ickes (Ickes, 2001; 2003) and modified by 
Barone et al. (2005). To whit, a client counsellor interation was filmed, and edited in the 
following manner.  
At the outset, it is important to note that the current study moved away from an 
on screen dyadic interaction, to a single person format. Ickes (2001) originally designed 
the paradigm so that the video depicted an interaction between two people, importantly 
with both of these people seen on screen. In the current study, whilst a dyad interacts – 
counsellor and client – the counsellor remains off screen and the client is the only person 
visible. This change was made to create a stimulus as close to a “live” counselling session 
as possible. 
The counsellor in the filmed interaction was a male, BACP accredited counsellor 
with over 2000 hours supervised experience. This counsellor used the Person Centred 
model of counselling during the interaction, chosen to prevent the clients being led as 
may have happened with a more directive approach. The clients in footage were all 
associates of the experimenter; they were females with previous experiences of 
counselling in a variety of settings. Females were chosen in this role as previous research 
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suggests they are easier to read in these settings (Ickes, 2003), a decision made in order 
to avoid floor effects. 
The counsellor in the interaction is from the Person Centred school; they were 
asked to provide “containment only”. This containment-only approach was to allow the 
client to open up issues as far as they wanted, but not to challenge the client, or push 
them any further than they wanted to go; this decision was taken on ethical grounds.  
Each client was asked to talk about any issue in their life they felt would be 
appropriate, bearing in mind that the resultant footage would be shown to others, albeit 
psychotherapists. The clients were asked to share whatever “depth” of information they 
felt comfortable with, but were asked to bring a topic that would at least elicit some 
emotional reaction in them. A lack of emotionality would both jeopardize the ecological 
validity of the session – most counselling sessions are at least somewhat emotionally 
charged – and may give rise to a lack of variation in participant scores. 
The study conducted was approved by Roehampton University Ethics Committee 
on the basis that informed written consent was obtained from the clients, and the 
counsellor, to participate in the interaction, and for the interaction to be shown to 
psychotherapists. Informed written consent was also obtained from all participants in the 
research. Neither clients, nor the counsellor received any remuneration for their work. 
A total of three clients were filmed, each for a 50-minute, mock counselling 
session. Filming took place in the private practice rooms of the counsellor in the 
interaction. The video-camera (Sony HDR Camcorder) was setup in such a way as to face 
the client in the interaction; the counsellor was off camera. In line with the hypothesis the 
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ideal zoom level on the camera would have been to focus on the face only. However, in 
order to reduce constrictions on the clients’ freedom of movement, and thereby 
maximise ecological validity, the camera was zoomed to show the clients’ upper body and 
face; see figure 3 below demonstrating this zoom level (the clients face has been covered 
for ethical reasons). This zoom level allowed the clients to shift in their seat without 
disappearing off camera, whilst negating the need for a camera operator, who may have 
made the clients feel awkward. 
 
Figure 3: screen shot demonstrating client position and camera zoom level. 
Once the filming was complete, clients viewed the film and were asked to stop it 
whenever they could remember what they were thinking and/or feeling at that moment 
in the session (Ickes, 2001). At each point where the film was stopped, the time was 
recorded, and the client wrote down what they were thinking and/or feeling at that 
moment. Once a record was made, the film was restarted and client stopped it at the 
next point they remembered a specific thought/feeling; a process reiterated until all the 
footage was reviewed. Importantly, clients were asked to record only feelings or thoughts 
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they had during the interaction, not new thoughts or feelings occurring whilst watching 
the footage (Ickes, 2001).  
At this point a single client’s film was excluded as the material they had spoken 
about was insufficiently varied in terms of emotional and thought content. This client’s 
emotion stop points were solely anger, and their topic of conversation only concerned 
their working environment. Although in the original paradigm such exclusion is not called 
for (Ickes, 2003), to prevent ceiling effects that may be caused by a homogeneity of 
emotion/thought content, the experimenter decided to exclude this client footage from 
further editing. 
Footage from the remaining two clients was edited (using Windows Moviemaker 
v.2012) by the experimenter to produce two films of approximately 20 minutes length, 
one from each client. Both films contained 15 emotion/thought stop points. 
From these two films a single film – 23 minutes and 5 seconds long – was chosen 
as the stimulus film. This choice was made as an initial pilot suggested that the scores on 
one film were well above previously achieved average in this paradigm (Ickes, 2003).  
whereas the score on the chosen film were more in line with this average.  
The length of footage between each stop point varied from 30 seconds to 2 
minutes. The length of these footage intervals varied dependent on two variables; the 
first being when the client had decided to stop the footage. The second was the need to 
edit the footage to produce a video of approximately 20 minutes, which would allow the 
experimental proceedure to last no more than 75 minutes in total. Thus, the 50 minute 
counselling session, needed to be condensed whilst at the same time maintaining a 
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narrative thread. Equally, a slightly longer initial lead in – the footage before stop 1 – was 
wanted to allow participants to begin to develop an understanding of the session tenor 
and “story” being told. Table 2 shows stop points with associated thoughts and emotions.  
Table 2: EAP stop points and their associated thoughts and emotions. 
Stop Emotion Time  Thought 
1 Anger 1.57 At Tom for making the situation so difficult. 
2 Happy  3.00 Thinking about holidays with family 
3 Fear 4.34 At the thought of daughter hurting herself. 
4 Contempt 6.12 For the childishness of the situation. 
5 Sad 7.38 For her children/the girls at not having grandparents. 
6 Contempt 8.52 For the childishness of the situation. 
7 Anger 11.47 At self for crying 
8 Sad 12.49 Tom’s divorce 
9 Anger 14.43 At Tom’s negativity 
10 Contempt 16.17 Tom’s drunken behaviour  
11 Anger 17.18 Tom’s inability to relate positively. 
12 Contempt 19.06 About Tom’s inability to accept her husband 
13 Anger 20.22 About always arguing with father 
14 Anger 21.49 At having to deal with constant put-downs.  
15 Contempt 22.44 For Tom’s childish behaviour. 
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As can be seen from Table 3 below – showing the totals for each emotion in the 
video stimulus – the emotions in the video were primarily negative. This negativity in 
emotion is in line with work done to create the Movie for the Assessment of Social 
Cognition (Dzoibek, et al., 2006); but also takes into consideration the idea that 
recognition of smiles tends to have a ceiling effect  (Gery, Miljkovitch, Berthoz, & 
Soussignan, 2009; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011). 








The main topic of the chosen film was an exploration by the client of the 
relationship between her and Tom4. Each stop point was edited into the film; all stop 
points were 17.5 seconds long. Participants used this time to fill out the multiple choice 
form recording their empathic inference answers. Thus, at the stop point the screen 
turned blue and told participants which stop number they were at, and asked them to 
“Please write your notes”. Five seconds before the footage was due to restart the writing 




on the screen turned from white to red and warned participants that “The video will 
restart in 5 seconds”. Footage then restared and continued until the next stop point, 
when again the screen changed, announcing the next stop point in the sequence. Figure 4  











Figure 4: schematic footage, stop point, and restart warnings. 
Empathic Inference Form 
The original empathic accuracy paradigm calls for raters to independently assess 
whether participant responses match the clients’ response. However, in order to increase 
the objectivity of this measure, a multiple choice response format was used. Clients had 
chosen their emotions from a list of 7 basic emotions — the same list was used for 
participants. Participants were asked to tick the emotion they felt corresponded to what 










Equally, clients’ thoughts were used as a single option in a list of 3 multiple choice 
answers. The multiple choice answer had been designed using guidelines for writing 
multiple choice questions, set out in taxonomy of multiple choice writing (Haladyna & 
Downing , 1989a; 1989b) and a more recent review of the utility of this taxonomy 
(Haladyna, Downing, & Rodriguez, 2002). Again, the pilot study showed that this multiple 
choice format did not materially increase the participants’ achieved score (see Discussion 
for more on this point). Figure 5 shows the first section of this form, depicting the 
possible answers for the first two of the 15 stop points; the rest of the empathic inference 
form will not be published for confidentiality reasons. 
 
Figure 5: Empathic inference multiple choice answer form. 
Scoring 
The empathic accuracy scoring procedure was modified from the original to allow 
for the multiple choice format of the test. The original scoring scheme is as follows; 
participants are awarded zero points by the rater where their answer contained 
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“essentially different content” (Ickes, 2003, p. 73) from the answers recorded by the 
other dyad member. Participants are awarded a single point where their answer contains 
“similar, but not the same content” (Ickes, 2003, p. 73), and two points where their 
answer contains “essentially the same content” (Ickes, 2003, p. 73) as the other dyad 
member. In the current scheme the content is fixed – due to the multiple choice format – 
but the scheme still relies on the idea of how close the content is to what the client – 
rather than the other dyad member – has said. To do this, participants where awarded a 
single point if they got the thought or emotion of the client right, and another point if 
they got both the thought and the emotion right; zero was scored if neither thought or 
emotion was correct. 
As the editing process had chosen those points at which the client had both a 
thought and an emotion recorded, there were a total of 30 points available – 15 for 
correct emotions identified, and 15 for correct thoughts identified. In order to gain an 
overall empathic accuracy score, all emotion and thought points were added to give a 
score out of 30. 
Micro Expression Training – eMETT 
The training tool chosen for this study was Paul Ekman’s METT programme. 
eMETT is designed specifically to train the user in how expressions of emotion appear on 
the face, and thus enhance the detection of micro-expressions of emotion.  
eMETT shows the user video footage beginning with two faces in a neutral 
configuration, the subject at rest. Gradually the faces morph through the onset of an 
emotion to the emotion’s macroexpression; then morph back to neutral. This morphing is 
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slowed down so that the shift from neutral to full emotion takes place over seven 
seconds. Each face shows slightly different configurations of the emotion in question; 
commentary points out the salient elements of each configuration, and points out the 
differences in the configurations. The program also contains videos demonstrating 
commonly confused facial displays of emotion for example: fear and surprise, and the 
running commentary seeks to highlight and explain the differences in the emotions. 
As well as these videos, the eMETT contains a pre-training (Benchmark), post-
training and mid-training test of emotion display recognition. The training procedure is 
therefore: Benchmark (test); Training; Practice (Test); Review (further training videos); 
Improvement measure (test). Figure 6 shows a screen shot of the program. A 
demonstration version of the METT program can be found at: 
http://www.paulekman.com/tools/training/emett30demo/training.php.  
 




Reading Task – Treatment as Usual  
The traditional training method for empathy is reading and practice; therefore the 
second group was assigned a reading task; as in Matsumoto and Hwang (2011) this task 
was used as a control. Two articles were given: Goldberg’s (2011) “The enduring presence 
of Heinz Kohut: Empathy and its vicissitudes”; and Rogers’s (1975) article “Empathic: An 
unappreciated way of being”. These article where chosen as they focused on empathy, 
and were of sufficient length that even the quickest reader would not finish both before 
the allotted time was over.  
QCAE – Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy  
Whilst a number of empathy scales exist for measuring empathy – for example the 
Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004), or the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis M. , 1983) – this study used the QCAE (Reniers, 
Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Vollm, 2011) as the initial assay of empathy. This measure 
was chosen as it is a more recent measure, which importantly, is a composite of a number 
of previously validated empathy questionnaires (Reniers et al., 2011). As a composite 
measure, it was hoped it would garner much of the  benefit of previous measures, whilst 
also being shorter than other questionnaires. As an example, the EQ is 60 items long, 
whereas the QCAE contains 31 items; using a shorter measure was again necessary to 
reduce the time the study required participants.  
The QCAE’s 31 questions are split into 5 subscales (Reniers et al., 2011), outlined 
in Table 4 below. The QCAE was used to assess pre-existing differences in the self 
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reported empathic ability of the groups. Appendix A shows a copy of the QCAE and its 
marking scheme.  
Table 4: QCAE subscales and descriptions. 
Main measure Subscale Description 
Cognitive Empathy Perspective Taking Items assay ability to view the 
world as other does. 
 Online Simulation Items designed to test the capacity 
to deliberately conjure the 
emotions of the other. 
Affective Empathy Emotion Contagion Items assess to what extent the 
participant automatically takes on 
the emotions of the other. 
 Proximal responsivity Items question to what extent the 
participant will feel the urge to 
respond to the emotions of the 
other when they are present.  
 Peripheral responsivity Items ask to what extent the 
participant will respond to the 
emotions of the other when they 





Before conducting statistical analyses it was necessary to assess the distribution of 
the key variables for their suitability for such tests. To assess whether the distribution of 
the sample is normal, the commonly used Shapiro-Wilkinson test was used, in 
conjunction with measurements of skew and Kurtosis. Below the outcomes of tests used 
to assess the shape of the distribution of the results for the key variables are presented. 
H1 assess the total empathic accuracy score, scores for total empathic accuracy 
did not differ significantly from normal, D(60) = 0.97, p = 0.13. H2 focuses on the 
emotional component of the empathic accuracy test, scores from which do not differ 
significantly from normal, D(60) = 0.97, p = 0.10. H3 looks at change within the eMETT 
training group, D(30) = 0.93, p = 0.04; scores from which differ significantly from a normal 
distribution. However, the result is marginal; moreover it is obtained from a low powered 
sample with Skewness (S = -0.64) and Kurtosis (K = -0.57). Age in our sample is similarly 
distributed, to whit it has both a distribution significantly different from normal, D(60) = 
0.93, p = 0.00, with Skewness (S = -0.73) and Kurtosis (K = -0.39). As Skewness and 
Kurtosis for these latter two variables is within the acceptable range of – 2 to + 2 (Brown, 
1997), we may proceed with parametric statistical analysis for all variables.  
As part of the preliminary analyses, we also looked at the prevalence of outliers. 
“Eyeballing” data is the traditional method of data analysis (Osborne & Overbay, 2004). 
Eyeballing this data might suggest a single outlier present in the data; this data point is 
circled in black on the scatter plot in Figure 7 below. Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, and Licata 
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(2013) recommend we apply to the data a more data based technique for outlier 
exclusion; the absolute deviation around the median. This method of outlier removal is 
not mean dependent and as such is a better outlier removal technique for mean based 
data (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013). Whilst eyeballing may suggest removal of 
the circled data point in Figure 7, the absolute deviation around the median (Md = 11) 
requires we exclude empathic accuracy data points of 19.90 and above. Such an outlier 
exclusion criteria results in not excluding the circled data point; this point will therefore 
remain in the data set during statistical analysis. 
 
Figure 7: scatter plot showing emotional empathic accuracy and total empathic accuracy. 
Blue Squares: Reading group; Red Square: eMETT group; Green Square: Overlapping data 













































Independent samples t-tests were conducted to test for differences in the 
baseline characteristics of the assigned groups. There were no significant differences in 
practice years between the eMETT group (M = 5.75, SD = 6.27) and reading group (M = 
7.42, SD = 9.37), t(58) = 0.81, p = 0.42. Nor were significant differences found in QCAE 
total score, eMETT group (M = 95.8, SD = 7.59) and reading group (M = 92.5, SD = 7.59), 
t(58) = 1.17, p = 0.25. Neither were any differences found in the QCAE subscales, between 
eMETT group QCAE cognitive empathy (M = 61.5, SD = 6.58) and reading group QCAE 
cognitive empathy (M = 60.8, SD = 12.9), t(58) = 0.25, p = 0.80; or between the affective 
empathy QCAE score, eMETT group (M = 34.3, SD = 4.54) versus the reading group (M = 
31.7, SD = 7.71), t(58) = 1.63, p = 0.10. Table 5 shows group means, standard deviations, 
effect sizes and significance values across the QCAE scores. 
Table 5: Participant QCAE scores at baseline. 
 QCAE Score 
 Affective p Cognitive p Total p 













Note: All values are means (SD) unless otherwise stated. QCAE: Questionnaire of 




Table 5 also reveals that whilst not statistically significant, there is an initial 
difference between QCAE scores, one investigated further using an ANCOVA showing no 
main effect of QCAE affective score F (1,55) = 1.94 p = 0.60 ƞp2 = 0.01; or QCAE cognitive 
score F (1, 55) = 0.88 p = 0.14 ƞp2 = 0.02 on empathic accuracy. 
Table 6 below is a breakdown of the prevalence of practice models within each 
group. A chi-square analysis was carried out to assess whether the practice models used 
by the therapists assigned to each group differed systematically. There were no 
significant difference in practice models used χ2 (6, N = 60) = 11.2 p = 0.08.  
Table 6: Participant practice models by group. 
  Group 




Person Centred 23 (7) 30  (9) 
CBT 10 (3) 13 (4) 
Psychodynamic 17 (5) 37 (11) 
Integrative 37 (11) 10 (3) 
Transaction Analysis 0 (0) 7  (2) 
Systemic  10  (3) 3  (1) 
Mindfulness Based 3    (1) 0  (0) 
 Total 100  (30) 100 (30) 
Note: Percentages shown (number of participants).  
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Although the chi-square analysis above revealed no significant differences, the 
result approached significance, and therefore a further single factor analysis of variance 
was carried out to ascertain whether therapy practice model had any effect on empathy 
score, either QCAE or EAP. The test carried out was Person-centred x CBT x 
Psychodynamic x Integrative; Transaction Analysis, Systemic and Mindfulness Based 
therapy were not included in the analysis as there were insufficient numbers of therapists 
in these groups to provide fully reliable mean statistics and Bonferroni post-hoc tests.  
Analysis of variance showed no main effect of therapy practice model on QCAE-Cognitive 
F (3, 49) = 0.34 p = 0.80; QCAE-Affective F (3, 49) = 0.10 p = 0.96; EA-Cognitive F (3, 49) = 
0.52 p = 0.67; EA-Emotion F (3, 49) = 0.68 p = 0.57. 
Table 7: Participant practice models by empathic measure. 
  Empathy Measure 











Person Centred 60.25 32.56 4.88 6.19 
CBT 57.71 33.14 4.57 7.00 
Psychodynamic 62.31 33.75 4.38 5.94 
Integrative 61.43 32.57 4.79 6.21 
Transaction Analysis 61.00 32.00 4.50 7.00 
Systemic  61.50 32.50 5.50 7.25 
Mindfulness Based 75.00 37.00 4.00 8.00 
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The age of the groups was the single variable which showed systematic variation; 
a t-test of the ages of psychotherapists assigned to each group revealed a significant 
difference. The average age of the eMETT group (M = 37.8.7, SD = 11.5) was significantly 
lower relative than the reading group (M = 44.6, SD =12.6), t(58) = 2.18, p = 0.03. 
As there was a significant difference in the ages of the groups, an ANCOVA was 
carried out to test for the effect of age on empathic accuracy score; this revealed no main 
effect of age on empathic accuracy score, F (1, 55) = 2.20 p = 0.14 ƞp2 = 0.04. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
Do participants in the experimental condition achieve a better overall empathic 
accuracy score on the EAP, compared to those allocated to the control condition? 
The effect of eMETT training on empathy was tested using an independent 
samples t-test, that indicated psychotherapists in the eMETT group (M = 11.7, SD = 2.78) 
showed greater empathic accuracy post intervention than those in the reading group (M 
= 10.4, SD = 2.37), t(58) = 2.05, p = 0.02, d = 0.55. The effect size shown is a medium 
effect size (Stangor, 2007). 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
Will participants in the experimental condition achieve a better emotional 




A further t-test was carried out to see if the difference shown in H1 loaded on the 
thought or emotion elements of the empathic accuracy score. A significant difference was 
recorded on the emotions score, the eMETT group (M = 5.20, SD = 2.09) showed greater 
empathic accuracy for emotion recognition than those assigned to the reading group (M = 
4.20, SD = 1.58), t(58) = 2.08, p = 0.03, d = 0.55. There was no difference on the thought 
recognition score, where the eMETT group (M = 6.53, SD = 1.70) showed equal empathic 
accuracy to those assigned to the reading group (M = 6.17, SD = 1.64), t(58) = 0.85, p = 
0.96. Table 8 summarises the differences found in both the total empathic accuracy score, 
and the scores on the thought and emotion subscales. 
Table 8: Participant empathic accuracy scores. 
Empathic Accuracy Score 
















Note: All values are means (SD) unless otherwise stated. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
Can participants in the eMETT group improve their ability to recognise facial 
expressions of emotion? This improvement indexed by an increase in participant eMETT 
score, from pre to post-test.  
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The hypothesised effect of eMETT training on emotion recognition was tested and 
an independent samples t-test was conducted, showing a significant improvement in 
emotion recognition of Ekman faces from before the eMETT training (M = 61.5, SD = 2.99) 
to after (M = 76.3, SD = 2.99), t(29) = 20.51, p < 0.001, d = 0.93. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) 
Is there a positive correlation between emotional empathic accuracy score on the 
EAP and the post-training eMETT score for participants in the experimental group? 
Planned correlational analyses were carried out between empathic accuracy 
scores and QCAE scores. QCAE and empathic accuracy were not significantly correlated r 
(58) = -0.043, p = 0.74. QCAE affective and empathic accuracy emotion were not 
correlated r (58) = -0.03, p = 0.80; neither was QCAE cognitive and empathic accuracy 
thought r (58) = -0.09, p = 0.49.  
Further correlational analysis was carried out between the increase in eMETT 
score from training, and empathic accuracy total score, though the two variables were 
not significantly correlated r (28) = 0.21, p = 0.26. Neither were the eMETT post-training 
score nor the eMETT increase correlated with QCAE score r (28) = 0.27, p = 0.15 and r (28) 









The Current Study’s Findings  
The results of the present study, replicated previous findings showing that eMETT 
training is capable of improving the recognition of facial expression of emotion (Hurley, 
2012; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011). This replication was in a sample of psychotherapy 
professionals, whereas previous findings concerned other populations. H3 asked whether 
participants in the eMETT group would improve their ability to recognise facial 
expressions of emotion; participants in the eMETT group did significantly improve their 
facial expression of emotion recognition.  
The current study provides some evidence that empathic accuracy may be 
improved by eMETT training, though the lack of a correlation between eMETT and EAP 
score means that this can only be a tentative conclusion. To put this another way, whilst 
the null hypothesis for H1 can be rejected, replication is required before this statement is 
relied upon; see below for further discussion of this point.  
H2 asked will participants in the experimental condition achieve a better 
emotional empathic accuracy score on the EAP, compared to those allocated to the 
Reading-TAU condition. eMETT training was shown to increase emotional empathy, 
rather than cognitive empathy, thus the expected difference in the emotional subscale of 
the EAP score was found. There was no significant positive correlation found between 
emotional empathic accuracy score on the EAP and the eMETT score for participants in 
the experimental group, providing no support for H4.  
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The hypotheses most central to this study were H1 and 2: that the EAP score 
would be higher for those receiving eMETT training, and that the difference in this EAP 
score would be shown on the emotional subscale of this score. Results from this study 
showed a statistical difference then, in the predicted direction, but as Huff (1954) pithily 
points out: “a difference is a difference only if it makes a difference”. This is to say a 
statistically significant difference is one thing, a clinically relevant difference quite 
another. Could this statically significant difference change the way practitioners work? A 
number of lines of argument suggest that there is clinical relevance to the current finding.  
Beginning with the training itself, this training – eMETT – represents a targeted 
intervention, one which was designed with clinical relevance in mind. Hassenstab et al 
(2007) showed that whilst psychotherapists were more cognitively empathic than non 
psychotherapist controls, this was not the case with emotional empathy. The finding from 
Hassenstab et al (2007) was bolstered, by the finding that psychotherapists were no 
better than controls at recognising facial expressions of emotion. The results from the 
current study, target both of these findings, and perhaps go some way to correcting 
them. The eMETT is targetted at the emotion recognition that Hassenstab et al (2007) 
showed that psychotheraptists could further advance, and as an intervention it improves 
emotional empathic accuracy. Tentatively then, it can be said the eMETT may help 
psychotherapists improve their empathic accuracy, and boost their emotional empathy. 
Further research would be needed to enable such claims to be made, as the measures, 
and methods, in both the current study and Hassenstab et al’s (2007) vary widely, but the 
current findings are promising. This promise must be tempered by the fact that the 
difference in empathic accuracy was shown within the EAP, which is not real life therapy. 
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In Reiss et al (2012), patients of the doctors trained were asked to rate the doctors’ 
empathy before and after their empathy training. If eMETT training of psychotherapists 
were shown to have an effect on psychotherapy clients using this sort of outcome 
measure, there would be a much firmer foundation for making claims about the 
effectiveness of this training. Such an in vivo trail of the eMETT is a crucial future research 
direction.    
The evidence provided by this study, especially that relating to H1 and H2, is 
perhaps further evidence of the importance of the face in the empathic process. This is 
clearly not the first evidence of this idea – hence the importance of the face in empathy 
research (Regenbogen & Habel, 2015) – but the current study suggests a more practical 
application of this research evidence. As pointed out in the introduction, the face and 
body have a communicative function on which there is not necessarily enough of a focus 
in psychotherapy training courses across the UK. These channels of communication are of 
greater focus in security service training (Navarro & Karlins, 2008), despite the fact that 
the research into these areas is carried out by psychologists themselves. This research 
may make a case for a reappraisal of psychotherapy training methods, a case lent further 
weight by the findings of Regenbogen et al (2012). The single communication channel 
knock out that had the greatest deleterious effect on empathic communication was the 
face (Regenbogen, et al., 2012). Prosody and speech content reduced emotion 
communication when they were “knocked out”, but not to the extent the face did . The 
centrality of the face then in empathic processing begs the question: should some form of 
training in facial expression of emotion be part of psychotherapy training courses? Clearly 
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the current finding, and the findings of Regenbogen et al (2012), do not make a sufficient 
case for overhauling course syllabi, but they certainly make a case for further research. 
Forty minutes of training showing a medium effect size, is perhaps concerning in 
its rapidity, and this is grounds for scepticism. However, this rapidity may be 
understandable when considering empathy involves multi-modal communication, with 
cross-modal augmentation (Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006). Evidence that speech 
perception in particular is improved by the perception of facial expressions (Kong & 
Edwards, 2011) is of special interest here. Might better speech perception enhance 
understanding of both its emotional nuance, and content; or to use the terminology of 
Regenbogen et al (2012), “prosody” and “speech content”. Thus, training one empathy 
channel should enrich the others; with psychotherapists already having a cognitive 
empathic advantage (Hassenstab, et al., 2007),  it is quite possible that a small amount of 
training has effects beyond what might happen in non-psychotherapy controls. An 
interesting piece of research might investigate such cross-modal augmentation, and study 
whether eMETT training – with an instructor perhaps – had a greater effect on 
psychotherapists, than non-psychotherapy controls. This putative research might also 
look at whether the increase in emotional empathy began to boost cognitive empathy 
further over time; it is certainly plausible that greater emotional perception will lead to 
greater emotional processing.  
Clinical Relevance 
An important difference exists between statistical significance, and clinical 
relevance, both are related to the development of knowledge; but the former has been 
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the focus thus far in this discussion, we now turn to the latter. Beginning with the 
literature reviewed, a blend was made of more phenomenological definitions of empathy 
with more postivistic, realist definitions. This definitional mix was inspired by what the 
author saw as the potential for synergy, centred around the concept of resonation. 
Resonation has a place in the phenomenological literature (Barrett-Lennard, 1993; Clarke, 
2010); however, as argued previously, this term is indistinct. By looking at resonance 
through the lens of both cognitive psychology and neuroscience, it can be seen as 
founded in the mirror neuron system. Founding the term resonace in lower levels of 
explanation – the sub-personal and the functional – allows a deeper understanding of the 
term resonance. In turn, this understanding gives rise to the idea that the face is critically 
important in eliciting resonance. This idea does not just break literature boundaries – one 
possible way to contribute to knowledge in a field – but reveals a new training method. In 
the case of this study, this training has been shown to increase empathic accuracy, and 
whilst replication of this result is necessary, it offers multiple avenues of extension, some 
outlined above.    
The definitional marriage above, also reveals within the literature key elements of 
any model of empathy, without which a model will likely fail to fully explain the available 
knowledge. The empathy quartet is a set of domains that if present in a model, are at 
least an indicator that the model is capable of explaning the range of empathy 
phenomena. Relatedly, a set of professional implications also became apparent when 
reviewing the literature; this provides a summary of how professional empathy is 
different to personal empathy. In terms of differentiation, professional empathy must be 
better informed, and more imaginative in its application; it must also remain emotionally 
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boundaried, be sustained over a number of time frames, and be explicitly communicated. 
These differences delineate how a model of professional empathy remains grounded in 
the personal empathy capacity, whilst critically, separating itself from this capacity. They 
also point to those areas facial expression training might fillip, helping the professional to 
enhance their empathy.  
The PAM structuring of emapthy points to the idea that cognitive and emotional 
empathy can both be seen to be either driven by, or developed through, the use of the 
Motor empathy system. This system is perception based, and enhancing emotional 
perception will therefore feed these domains, a claim that requires further research, but 
for which the current study provides some first tentative evidence. For the counsellor, 
this means enhanced resonation is achievable; more specifically, their empathy may 
become better boundaried, more informed, and therefore, perhaps capable of more 
imaginative application. Emotional boundaries may be permeable, at least from the 
perspective of relational models of psychotherapy, but having an understanding of where 
certain feelings may be resonating from, may help a counsellor both maintain their own 
boundaries, whilst also seeking to inform the clients. Being able to reflect upon emotions 
that may have been perceived clearer, will allow counsellors to better inform their 
empathy, and their therapeutic interventions. Reflection on emotions, especially where 
there is a nuanced capacity to track emotions, may lead the counsellor to more 
imaginative ways of grasping clients’ felt level experience.  
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Refining the EAP 
A further contribution to the knowledge that this study has made, comes from its 
use, and refinement, of the EAP. Ickes’ (2001, 2003) paradigm, seems an ideal format for 
counselling psychology assessment and training; relying as it does, on what the client 
experiences in a session. EAP is a methodology that can encompass phenomenological 
experience, whilst at the same time give empirical objectivity. This objectivity has been 
further enhanced by the modification made in this study; specifically, converting the 
answer format into multiple choice questions (MCQ). MCQs however, not only make the 
EAP more objective, but may also serve to answer Elliot et al’s (2011) critique of the 
paradigm: that it is “time-consuming”. The original EAP requires a number of raters to 
spend time judging the answer alikeness of participant responses, with the client’s 
original responses. MCQ can be marked by a single researcher rather than multiple raters, 
reducing the number of people needed; and marking questions correct or incorrect, is 
considerably less time consuming than making textual judgements. The MCQ refinement 
might be further enhanced by increasing the number of options on the multiple choice 
form, though this may not substantially effect test efficacy (see Haladyna, Downing and 
Rodriguez (2002) for further discussion of this point). A concern when using MCQ might 
be that they lead to more accurate responses, people have a one in three chance of 
getting the anwser right in the current test format. This chance probably compares 
favourably with the more freestyle responses on the original EAP, such free writing is 
likely to create much greater variance in the sample. Though scores in the current study 
are not really comparable with previous studies, the current study’s EAP percentage 
scores are not significantly different to those previously reported (Ickes, 2003). Again, 
further empiracal testing would be required; this could compare average totals achieved 
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on a single EAP test, one group assayed by rater judgements, and another attaining MCQ 
scores. 
The Need for a Psychotherapy Specific Framework 
Any contribution to knowledge that this study makes will be partially understood 
through the empathic model outlined above. Empathy is given a fillip by eMETT training; 
but, to extend our understanding how this happens, and if this training might be of 
further utility, a model of practical application is needed. By way of analogy, we can 
examine the use of facial expression of emotion in the deception detection literature. This 
is predicated on the understanding that emotions do not occur in unison with what is 
expressed, and interpreting this disharmony is a critical ingredient in the detective 
process (Navarro & Karlins, 2008; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). “Reading faces” through a 
deception detection framework, requires an understanding of the relationship between: 
the questions of the interviewer; the emotional expression elicited; and what these 
emotions may indicate outside of the speech content of the person being questioned 
(Navarro & Karlins, 2008).  Placing the facial expression of affect training in such a 
framework, increases its utility (Navarro & Karlins, 2008). Such a framework for 
psychotherapeutic understanding of emotion, would potentially increase the clinical 
relevance of these findings to psychotherapists.  
The framework used by Navarro and Karlins (2008) is aimed at the use of 
microexpressions for deception detection. This framework works on the basis of 
establishing a baseline of the interviewees’ body language – or facial expression – and 
then working out how things said by the interrogator cause this to alter. In a 
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psychotherapy setting this would be inappropriate, regardless of the more aggressive 
vocabulary of the deception detection decision framework. Firstly, whilst the “baseline” 
of a client, and any shifts from it, would be a possible strategy for making empathic 
inferences, this is too constrictive for a psychotherapy setting. In law enforcement, 
insurance claims, and legal disputes, it is often the case that deception is being actively 
pursued by one side, and actively searched for by the other (ten Brinke, et al., 2012); in 
psychotherapy, this is not the case. Whilst it is certianly true that some clients may wish 
to keep information concealed – at least in the initial stages of the relationship, as per the 
Introduction to the current study, – it is not for the psychotherapist to “search” for this.  
Psychotherapy is not designed to uncover falsehood, but rather, to explore meaning and 
generate understanding. Moreover, the “stakes” (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010, p. 57) in 
psychotherapy, are generally not incarceration or fines – as in deception detection, –  but 
rather wellbeing and self understanding. The variation in “stakes” between detective 
work, and therapy work is a factor that will affect the congruence between clients’ verbal 
expression and facial expressions. These latter points require exploration; they also point 
to the need for the development of a psychotherapy specific framework for the practical 
application of facially expressed affect in client work.  
Critical Analysis 
The current study has shown promising results, providing some grounds for 
further research, and interesting avenues for theoretical endeavour. However, a closer 
look at the baseline data reveals some important differences, which whilst not statistically 
significant, bear consideration. Beginning with H3, the lack of a correlation, in the 
experimental group, between emotional empathic accuracy score on the EAP, and eMETT 
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score, is pertinent. This correlation, if present, would suggest a link between an increasing 
eMETT score and increasing empathic accuracy. Whilst this link would not show 
causation, it would certainly bolster the other findings of this study. A replication of the 
current study, using a larger sample size, may produce such a correlation, or provide a 
source of further investigative avenues.  
In terms of considering the baseline data, we can begin by looking at the QCAE 
score. The affective empathy score of the QCAE, is higher in the eMETT group. This bias 
whilst not significant, does arguably cast some doubt upon the finding in H1. The 
experimental design relied somewhat heavily on there being no pre-existing differences 
in the groups. Convenience allocation may have skewed the make-up of the experimental 
groups; but it is important to note the QCAE affective measure, is not necessarily 
measuring the same faculty, or concept, as the EAP affective score. Though both these 
measures are clearly aimed at the same empathic trait, they measure slightly different 
markers. Moreover, the QCAE is a questionnaire, and subject to a number of biases, 
biases which may also relate to the variation in the therapeutic models used by the 
sample; a point elaborated below. Nonetheless, on the – operative – assumption that the 
QCAE, and EAP, measure the same human faculty, then we must conclude that there was 
a pre-existing bias toward the direction predicted by H1. There is grounds then to argue 
that replication is particularly important in the case of these results. This problem would 
arguably have been nullified by a before after design. Such a design could have measured 
empathic accuracy before training and after training, and it was the authors initial 
intention to use such a design, one of the reasons 3 videos where originally shot. 
However, this design would have required a greater number of participants, and a longer 
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time commitment of 85 minutes. On consideration, and advice, it was felt that such a 
length of time would make participant recruitment almost untenable. This was especially 
so, as the author’s cohort – a potentially valuable source of participants – knew the 
hypothesis, and were therefore excluded from recruitment. The reality of the research 
process was that recruitment was the most difficult element, and as such, it would seem 
the study’s eventual design was prudent. Future replications of this result should perhaps 
revert to the original before after design, which would remove the above outlined 
element of doubt.  
Another anomaly in baseline characteristics is the division of therapy practice 
models within the sample. Again, although not significant, the chi-square analysis result is 
marginal, though there are some obvious group differences. Most glaringly, there are 
almost 4 times as many Integrative Practitioners in the Reading-TAU group, as in the 
eMETT group.  Moreover, there are over double the number of Psychodynamic 
Practitioners in the eMETT group, as compared to the Reading-TAU group. These 
differences are potentially important, they somewhat undermine the findings of this 
study, as they may suggest different reactions to the video stimuli. How a participant 
perceived the client in the interaction may well have been altered by their model of 
practice. Such alterations could well have had an impact on the results, as the differences 
in group make up, whilst not statistically significant, are nonetheless, large; large enough 
perhaps to skew the main effect reported here.  
One of the factors that may have helped skew the therapy practice model 
distribution within the sample, was the preference of some participants not to have 
eMETT training. Regrettably no records of these participants were kept, but a minority of 
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participants specifically requested not to be given the training. This group, in the main, 
objected to the idea that of basic emotions – that the training is based on – and did not 
want their therapeutic practice effected or influenced by the training. These participants 
were then re-allocated to the Reading-TAU group, one advantage of convenience 
allocation, but also a demonstration of how this might lead to anomalous findings. Again, 
future replications should be aware of this as a possibility and either record these 
participants for separate analysis, or apply strict randomisation. 
The only statistically significant difference in the baseline characteristics of our 
samples was their age, the eMETT group being on average younger than the Reading-TAU 
group. Whilst there is certainly evidence that aging has deleterious effect on memory, 
these effects are more often observed in those over the age of 50 (Light, Prull, LaVoie, & 
Healy, 2000). The current sample contained 11 participants over the age of 50, 6 in the 
Reading-TAU group, and 5 in the eMETT group; any age related memory effects then are 
evenly distributed, and unlikely to have an effect on the results. Moreover, evidence 
suggests that face learning peaks 10 years after name recognition – at 30-34 year of age 
rather than 23-24 years of age (Germine, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2010). Name 
recognition would traditionally be considered semantic memory (Dilkina, McClelland, & 
Plaut, 2008; Eysenck & Keane, 2005), the memory often tested in studies showing decline 
with age, whereas face recognition, is a separate domain. It is debatable whether face 
recognition, and facial expression recognition are in fact the same phenomenon; 
nonetheless Germine, Duchaine and Nakayama’s (2010) finding casts further doubt on 
the idea that the current results may be purely accounted for by an age disparity.  
105 
 
The findings in Hassenstab et al (2007) further elucidate the point about the age of 
participants.  Hassenstab et al’s (2007) experimental groups were matched for age; 
however, the psychotherapist group was younger, not significantly so, but nonetheless, 
there was no inter-group difference in facial expression recognition. Similarly then here, a 
case can be made that this age difference is unimportant; indeed, the age differential may 
reinforce the importance of these findings. Whilst not statistically significant, there was 
also difference in the practice years of our sample – the eMETT group having less practice 
years 5.75 vs 7.42 than the Reading-TAU group. A younger group of practitioners, with 
less practice years, should arguably be less empathically accurate than a group of more 
experienced, older professionals; that 40 minutes of training may reverse this, should be 
investigated.  
Avenues for Further Refinement 
Notwithstanding the need for further research of the training effect shown in this 
study, consideration can be given to how this intervention might be enhanced. Forty 
minutes of eMETT training as an empathy intervention can be compared with: three 
months of empathy training completed in Barone et al (2005), and the three hours of 
training spread over three months used in Riess et al (2012). This study used the eMETT 
once, for 40 minutes; it is designed to be used for 75 minutes, and on more than one 
occasion, the effects of the eMETT are incremental (Hurley, 2012). Hurley (2012) used 
three different training interventions, every two weeks, comparing their efficacy in 
training facial expression of emotion. The self-led training group, used eMETT as this 
study did – i.e. participants simply used the eMETT according to the instructions provided 
within the training package. This group showed a statistically significant increase in 
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microexpression recognition ability for the first two training periods, leading to a 25% 
increase in microexpression recognition scores (Hurley, 2012). It is open to question then 
whether using more – and longer – iterations of the eMETT training, might augment the 
effectiveness of this intervention, further enhancing empathic accuracy. Further analysis 
of Hurley’s (2012) results, is indicative of directions for future research into this training.  
Hurley’s (2012) study showed that eMETT self-led training, was less effective than 
eMETT plus instruction from a teacher.  With eMETT plus teacher, the incremental 
changes in microexpression recognition continued for the entire 6 week training period, 
and ended in a 30% increase in microexpression recognition. Self-led eMETT participants, 
saw a decrement in microexpression recognition scores at the third test period, reducing 
their accuracy in microexpression detection to 74.57%. Whilst still a significant 
improvement over the whole period, this result compares unfavourably to eMETT plus 
teacher. This latter group achieved an overall accuracy rate of 88.31%. Perhaps 
complementing the eMETT with a teacher/trainer, could develop the effects shown in this 
study. This point is lent further weight, when considering the difference between the 
experimental protocol and a training procedure; a point we turn to now.  
This study was based on an experiment designed to minimise the links between its 
various elements; no explanation was given as to why participants completed the tasks 
they were asked to do, and no suggestion was made as to what effect this might have on 
their performance on the EAP. In a training setting, delegates – rather than participants – 
would be told that reading the text, or completing the eMETT, would enhance their 
empathic accuracy. These delegates would understand exactly what the purpose of their 
participation was, and would probably be motivated to concentrate on the tasks at hand; 
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potentially further enhancing eMETT scores, and perhaps, EAP scores. Seemingly then, a 
blend of motivation, eMETT and teacher, and perhaps an “Emotional Accuracy 
Framework”, would create a better empathy training intervention. What is clear, is that 
the optimal training time, frequency, and framework, are very far from being established. 
Again, further research would be needed to test varying training regimens for their 
efficacy, and equally, their effect on empathic accuracy: a very different concept to 
emotion recognition.  
One further point garnered from Hurley’s (2012) work, is one that may undermine 
the findings in the present study. One of the control conditions was a motivational speech 
based on the work of Paul Ekman. This speech was made to a group of participants who 
showed a statistically significant increase in emotion recognition accuracy. Another 
control condition – the exposure control – simply showed participants Ekman faces, 
without training. This control condition also improved their recognition accuracy by a 
statistically significant amount. The control condition in the current experiment received 
reading on empathy, but this did not contain any facial stimuli; this condition therefore 
may have not been cued in the same way the eMETT condition was. A further control, 
exposing participants to Ekman faces, would have improved the validity of these findings. 
This condition was considered as part of the original design, but was not feasible. 
Moreover, the idea that simple cueing to look at the face more improves emotion 
recognition, and subsequently empathy, is still a clarion call to therapists to assess the 
way they empathise, and what their focus in a session is. 
Although the current study refined the EA methodology somewhat, there is clearly 
room for further improvement, a fact that became apparent during testing. One facet of 
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the EAP response form that nearly all participants fedback about, was that they were 
being asked to choose a single emotion from a list in the MCQs. Participants felt that this 
was unrealistic, a point Ekman (2003b) makes when talking about his facial archetypes; to 
whit such archetypes do not occour regularly, in vivo expressions are more usually subtle 
blends, or supressed. Whilst this is true, two point must be made; firstly, as discussed 
above, microexpression training is not just a matter of bald application, but will require 
guidance and practice; such direction was not part of this experiment. Secondly, single 
emotions were a homogenisation made to increase objectivity, but this comes at the cost 
of simplification. Clearly, any experimental method will come up against 
phenomenological limitations, but there are perhaps alternative schemes for MCQ 
answers. One possibility, would be to use a format that asks participants to chose two 
emotions on the response sheet, marking a “primary” and “secondary” emotion. Scoring 
this would require a more complex marking system, awarding points for correct answers 
and correct emotional order – primary, secondary – but this may go some way to 
answering participant feedback, and allow for more ecologically valid design.   
Social Construction Analysis 
Having discussed the results, extensions, and limitations of this research, the final 
methodological consideration, must be completed, interrogating the reported findings of 
the experiment in the light of the surrounding social reality. Already alluded to in passing, 
are a number of areas of critique that social constructionists might take somewhat 
further. Ekman faces, a critical part of the eMETT, and thus a fundamental part of the 
current study are a case in point. Ekman himself (2003b) points out that these faces are 
extremes, and most emotion is a more subtle instance, or blend, of the basic emotions. 
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Social constructionist critique, would go further; a constructionist would argue that the 
idea of “basic emotions” is simply a westernised reified construct; carving up an 
emotional gamut; only one of a number of possible constructions of the way humans 
express themselves (Burr, 2003).  
Hepburn & Jackson (2009) take a discursive psychology position on cross-cultural 
evidence of basic emotions, viewing such evidence as – if not fundementally flawed, – 
then certainly to be viewed with caution. Such realist positions – Hepburn & Jackson 
(2009) would argue, – are not a study of the emergent property of a phenomenon, but 
rather see emotion as something that “is, and the problem is to look for it – emotion – 
cross-culturally” (2009, p. 183; their emphasis). Discursive psychology would study 
emotion – especially cross-culturally, – by seeking understanding of how emotion is used 
in society. Questions for such studies might include: what is the discourse surrounding 
the idea of emotion; how do people evoke and embody emotion; what use is made of 
emotion in ordinary interaction. Applying a discursive psychology analysis to the current 
study requires skepticism of the findings; based as they are, on the application of basic 
emotion training. Moreover, a discursive perspective on empathy, would also see this 
concept as derived from, and created through, discourse.  
Moving away from discourse, and focusing more on the dominant construction of 
of human nature; an individualistic, western ideal, holds dominion in the society 
surrounding the research, and subsequently, will be present within the researcher. 
Empathy viewed this way, locates a set of phenomena in the brain; or seeks to 
understand a process in therapy. Even more relational models of empathy, still reify 
empathy, it is a thing that is to be pursued; contrast this with Gergen (2009), who posits 
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the idea of a relational mind. The relational mind is one not located in the individual, but 
rather informed by the performances of those in a social space. Emotions are not things 
that happen in a human; they are not an internal reality, displayed and expressed to 
others, but a performance of relational action. Gergen argues “it’s not that we have 
emotions, a thought, or a memory so much as we do them” (2009, p. 99); and whilst he 
does not explain how this might effect the concept of empathy, one can extrapolate this 
from his position quite easily. Empathy then is not a capacity that humans have, but 
simply a way of locating in the indivual mind something that is actually a relational 
phenomena. If mind is relational, and emotions are actions, then “empathy” simply 
describes a decoding of action and applying a socially acceptable, and socially derived 
label. In a sense, “empathy” is not greatly different from speech recognition; however, 
this seeming simplification, has an important ramification. If empathy is socially created, 
not personally located; people will perform actions in a social environment, and these 
actions will be interpreted as “emotions”. These “emotions” are shared amongst the 
group; they do not get transmitted by one individual, and received by another, but rather 
co-created. From this perspective, we can see that the empathy fillip is certainly to be 
viewed with skepticism from a constructionist perspective. This does not nullify, or usurp 
the findings of this research, but cautions the researcher against zealotry, and begs 
humility. In the words of Niezstche:  
“Truth has never yet clung to the arm of an inflexible man”  






This research set out to test an idea, an idea planted and germinated in my clinical 
work. This idea was fairly simple in a way: that the eMETT training I was doing was in 
some way helping me to “tune into” my clients. By reviewing the literature, this idea was 
both developed, and given foundation; “tune into” became empathy, and the relevant 
research surrounding eMETT was uncovered. The design and method of the experiment 
sought to provide validity, and importantly, to validate my experience. So I asked the 
question: if eMETT helps me, can it help my peers? In terms of validity, it seems that my 
idea might be valid, though more research is needed. The validation given to my 
experience of tuning into clients was not phenomenologically exact; however, I can 
choose to be influenced by positive findings, feeling good about corroboration of my 
experience. In the cold words of science: we reject the null hypothesis, but to me, I feel 
my “moment of inspiration” has been validated, I feel uplifted, happy. This happiness also 
imparts to me a sense of confidence, a sense bolstered by the feeling that I have done a 
job well, and gained insight into an inchoate phenomena. However, this confidence is 
tempered by the social constructionist position, I understand that the experiment I 
conducted is socially situated, and makes use of social constructions. Equally, even 
without a more generalised critique like social constructionism, there is clearly room for 
improvement within the current study’s method and design. So I take both experience 
and learning from my travels from research proposal to thesis submission, and a pointer 
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